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Introduction
Ever since the first Europeans came to this country in search of freedom and
opportunity, America has been viewed as a safe haven and a source of hope
for millions of people around the globe. We take tremendous pride in our
leading efforts to assist refugees, and we continue to cherish the great and
generous spirit embodied by our magnificent Statute of Liberty. As Emma
Lazarus wrote in her timeless sonnet to the famed Mother of Exiles, 'from
her beacon-hand glows worldwide welcome.'1
Although the United States historically has been a nation of immigrants
and refugees,2 its willingness to admit outsiders has competed with public
sentiment in favor of limiting immigration flow.3 This ironic reluctance to
accept newcomers is not peculiar to Americans. Since the end of the Cold
War, Western nations in particular have manifested increased resistance to
asylum seekers, suspicious of their motives and anxious about the conse-
quences of mass exoduses. 4
Statistics indicate that there are more than twenty-seven million refu-
gees around the world,5 a clear reflection of the post-Cold War political
and social instability in the Third World and Eastern Europe.6 These num-
1. Proclamation No. 6219, 3 C.ER. 239-40 (1990) (President George Bush pro-
claiming Refugee Day, 1990).
2. The term "refugee" refers to a person obliged by war or persecution to leave his
or her dwelling and seek refuge abroad. MicHAEL R. MARRus, THE UNwANmo: EUROPEAN
REFUGEES IN THE TwENv iH CENTURY 3 (1985). International law and U.S. immigration
law expand upon this general definition by specifying requirements which must be sat-
isfied before a person may qualify for refugee status and protection. See infra notes 32,
50 and accompanying text.
3. Congress first began regulating the influx of immigrants over a century ago. See,
e.g., Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 58-59 (the first of the so-called Chi-
nese Exclusion Laws, suspending for ten years the "coming of Chinese laborers to the
United States").
4. The majority of mass movements, especially those in Third World countries, are
caused by war, ethnic strife, and socioeconomic inequalities in the home state. Deep
ethnic divisions and economic underdevelopment have contributed to the domestic con-
flict and political instability which usually precedes mass exodus. GIL LOESCHER, REFU-
GEE MOVEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL SEcuRrrY 28 (Adelphi Papers No. 268, 1992).
5. REFUGEES AT A GLANCE: A MoNTHLY DIGEST OF UNHCR AcTivmrEs, Aug. 1995, at
1 (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, New York, N.Y.) [here-
inafter Refugee Digest] (on file with author).
'6. See LOESCHER, supra note 4, at 9-27 (discussing the dimensions of the refugee
problem in the post-Cold War world).
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bers preoccupy the citizens of developed countries who perceive refugees
as competitors for local resources and as a threat to the cultural identities
of the receiving states. 7 Consequently, the phenomenon of mass exodus
has forced states to reevaluate their commitments under international law
and to formulate emergency responses to these population movements.
This Note addresses the major crisis management options considered by
Western nations and proposes a solution to refugee situations in the post-
Cold War world.
Part I of this Note examines the significant body of refugee law devel-
oped in the twentieth century. It traces the international origins of the "ref-
ugee" definition and describes the rationale underlying the Refugee
Convention of 19518 and its 1967 Protocol.9 In addition, Part I clarifies
the obligations of signatories to the 1951 Convention and evaluates the
performance of those responsibilities by the United States during the Cold
War.
Part II depicts the emerging standard of international refugee obliga-
tions in an era of protectionist law-making. The section briefly examines
the recent Schengen' 0 and Dublin 1 Conventions in Western Europe as
well as the Asylum Amendment to the German Constitution.1 2 Part II then
examines the U.S. policy of interdiction as applied to Haitian and Cuban
asylum seekers. The section concludes by considering the Clinton Admin-
istration's decision to pursue a policy of humanitarian intervention as a
response to the security threat posed by the mass refugee influx from Haiti.
Part III presents three potential response strategies: (1) reconcile
humanitarian intervention with the U.N. Charter's prohibition on the use
of force, (2) legitimate interdiction by eliminating the Refugee Convention's
mandatory principle of nonrefoulement, 13 and (3) establish an interna-
tional monitoring agency to facilitate and finance regional burden-sharing
in accordance with the objectives of refugee law. This Note advocates the
third proposal as the only legally justified and politically practical solu-
tion. A burden-sharing approach to the contemporary problems of refugee
law builds upon regional efforts already underway in Europe and the Amer-
7. Id. at 48-49.
8. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
9. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
10. Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Bor-
ders and the Convention Applying the Agreement, Belg.-Fr.-F.R.G.-Lux.-Neth., 30 LL.M.
68; Agreement, June 14, 1985, 30 I.L.M. 73 [hereinafter Schengen Agreement]; Conven-
tion, June 19, 1990, 30 LL.M. 84 [hereinafter Schengen Convention].
11. Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for
Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities, June 15,
1990, 30 LL.M. 425 [hereinafter Dublin Convention].
12. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 16a.
13. This principle prohibits expulsion or return of a refugee to territories "where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion." 1951 Convention, supra note
8, art. 33, para. 1.
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icas. In addition, such a solution respects the territorial sovereignty of
nations and recognizes the political necessity that members of the interna-
tional community promote their own national interests.
I. The Development of International Refugee Law
A. Providing a Legal and Institutional Framework for Refugee
Protection
The First World War resulted in the collapse of four dynastic empires
which had dominated Eastern Europe for centuries. 14 This postwar polit-
ical transformation induced several refugee movements. 15 Germans
poured across the new frontiers from Alsace-Lorraine following its reat-
tachment to France.16 Others moved south from northern Schleswig, terri-
tory now governed by Denmark. 17 Refugees also entered Germany from
Eupen and Malmady, now joined to Belgium.18 From the East, German
refugees moved westward from former Reich provinces which had become
part of Poland as a result of the Treaty of Versailles.' 9 In addition, the
Treaty of Trianon, which officially signaled the collapse of Hapsburg
authority, triggered a massive exodus of Hungarians from areas lost to
Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. 20
Flight from the former tsarist empire after the Russian Revolution also
involved many nationalities. There was a particularly large displacement of
Jews resulting from their systematic persecution along the western border-
lands of Russia.21 Other refugees hostile to the Bolshevik regime either
poured north into Finland and the Baltic provinces or moved south to
Odessa and the Crimea. 22 Between 1918 and 1920, refugees fleeing the
revolution crossed the Ukrainian border into Poland, as did thousands of
Poles who had been driven eastward during World War 1.23
The post-War peace treaties 24 acknowledged that millions of people
would be residing as minorities in culturally, linguistically, or religiously
alien environments. Western nations initially enlisted the aid of private
agencies to address the emerging burdens of refugee assistance. However,
14. These dynasties were the Ottoman, the Romanov, the Hapsburg, and the Hohen-
zollern empires. MARRus, supra note 2, at 52.
15. Id. at 70-74. See also EUGENE M. KUISCHER, EUROPE ON THE MOVe: WAR AND
POPULATION CHANGES, 1917-47, at 166-74 (1948).




20. In 1921, Hungary announced the arrival of approximately 139,390 refugees
from Rumania, 56,657 from Czechoslovakia, and 37,456 from Yugoslavia. Id. at 72.
21. Id. at 61.
22. Id. at 56.
23. Id. at 57.
24. These treaties included: the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) between Germany,
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Russia, the Treaty of Versailles (1919), the
Treaty of Saint-Germain (1919) between the Allied Powers and Austria, the Treaty of
Trianon (1920) between the Allied Powers and Hungary, and the Treaty of Riga (1921)
settling the Polish-Soviet frontier.
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international cooperation after World War I eventually resulted in the crea-
tion of the League of Nations.25 In 1921, the League of Nations estab-
lished the position of High Commissioner for Refugees to address refugee
problems.26 Unfortunately, support for the Commission dissipated soon
after its formation, as did the goal of achieving universally protective refu-
gee policies, because of resistance from countries receiving refugees during
the years immediately preceding World War 11.27
Once the world community became aware of the full extent of atroci-
ties committed by Nazi Germany during the War, most governments
acknowledged, at least to some degree, that refugee and asylum issues were
critical to the safety of nations and the preservation of human rights.28 In
the late 1940s, the United States admitted approximately 350,000 individ-
uals who had been displaced as a result of the War.29 By 1950, the newly
formed United Nations had initiated measures designed to define interna-
tional refugee law. The first priority of the U.N. General Assembly was to
establish an office which would effectively oversee international refugee
issues, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).30
A subsequent international conference produced the United Nations Con-
25. The scope and carnage of World War I had a considerable impact on the attitude
of States toward the use of force. With the strong support of President Woodrow Wil-
son, the creation of the League of Nations became an integral part of the peace settle-
ment. Though the League did not prohibit war or the use of force, it did set up a
procedure to restrict international hostilities to tolerable levels. In particular, the League
system included a guarantee by member states of the political independence and territo-
rial integrity of each member against external aggression and authorized the use of col-
lective economic and military measures to defeat such aggression. JOHN F. MuRPHY, THE
UNrrED NATIONS AND THsE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE 10 (1982). See MALcoLM
N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 542-43 (2d ed. 1986).
26. See David A. Martin, Strategies for a Resistant World: Human Rights Initiatives and
the Need for Alternatives to Refugee Interdiction, 26 CoRNEL INT'L LJ. 753, 755 (1993);
MARRus, supra note 2, at 86-91.
27. A large number of anti-fascist refugees attempted to flee the new governments in
Italy and Germany during the 1930s. In particular, the Western democracies wimessed
panic-stricken flight during the two years prior to the outbreak of the Second World
War. Economic depression in the United States and Western Europe also contributed to
anti-immigrant policies. France, however, was an early haven for asylum seekers until it
also added restrictions to its immigration law. The League of Nations was powerless to
act throughout this crisis, given the fact that most Member States were reluctant to
accept more than a few thousand refugees. In 1938, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy,
Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands took measures to reduce their earlier rates of
acceptance and to reinforce frontier guards. Within a year, Europe was immersed in
another grand scale war while Adolf Hitler simultaneously proceeded with his policy of
ridding the Reich of non-Aryans and political dissenters. See MmmRus, supra note 2, at
122-207.
28. Martin, supra note 26, at 755.
29. GIL LoEscmmR & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALcuLATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND
A mUCA'S HALOPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENr 2 (1986). The number of displaced
persons at the conclusion of World War II totaled nearly 14 million. The Soviet Union
claimed that it took charge of over 7.2 million forced laborers and prisoners of war. The
French cared for more than 1.6 million Polish nationals, 700,000 Italians, 350,000
Czechoslovakians, 300,000 Belgians, and over 300,000 Dutch. MRmuS, supra note 2, at
299.
30. The responsibilities of the High Commissioner include:
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vention Relating to the Status of Refugees, an agreement which directly
addressed the problem of European refugee flows due to events prior to
1951.31 A 1967 Protocol modified the 1951 Convention to apply a broader
definition of refugee.3 2
The 1967 definition requires four elements for a person to attain refu-
gee status: (1) the person must be outside the country of his nationality;
(2) the person must be unwilling or unable to seek the protection of that
country; (3) this inability or unwillingness must arise from a well-founded
fear of persecution; and (4) the feared persecution must derive from being
a member of a certain race, religion, nationality, or particular social group
or from holding a particular political opinion.3 3 If one qualifies as a refu-
gee under the Convention, he is entitled to certain statutory protections.
Article 33 of the Convention articulates the principle of nonrefoulement,
the keystone of a refugee's rights under international law. This principle
(1) promoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for
the protection of refugees, supervising their application and proposing amend-
ments thereto;
(2) promoting through special agreements with governments the execution of
any measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the
number requiring protection;
(3) assisting governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation
or assimilation within new national communities;
(4) promoting admission of refugees, not excluding those in the most destitute
categories, to the territories of States;
(5) endeavoring to obtain permission for refugees to transfer their assets and
especially those necessary for their resettlement;
(6) obtaining from governments information concerning the number and condi-
tions of refugees in their territories and the laws and regulations concerning
them;
(7) keeping in close touch with the governments and inter-governmental organi-
zations concerned;
(8) establishing contact in such manner as he may think best with private orga-
nizations dealing with refugee questions;
(9) facilitating the co-ordination of the efforts of private organizations con-
cerned with the welfare of refugees.
G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
31. 1951 Convention, supra note 8, art. 1.
32. The 1951 Convention defines refugee as any person who,
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
1951 Convention, supra note 8, art. 1, para. A.
The 1967 Protocol eliminated theJanuary 1, 1951 limitation and extended protection
to all contemporary refugees. 1967 Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1.
33. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. This definition of refugee originated
with the International Refugee Organization (I.R.O.), which was founded in 1946. The
world community established the I.R.O. to protect victims of Nazi, Fascist, or collabora-
tor regimes who presented valid objections such as persecution or a reasonable fear of
such persecution in their home states. See Constitution of the International Refugee
Organization, Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat.(3) 3037, 18 U.N.T.S. 3.
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dictates that a state may not return a refugee within its borders to his or
her home country to face persecution.34 A refugee, however, must first be
admitted within the borders of the receiving state and, once there, may still
be removed to another country willing to extend acceptance and protec-
tion. The Convention does not bestow a right to asylum upon the refugee.
Thus, any conferred right is actually a right of the state, as a sovereign, to
grant asylum at its discretion.
B. U.S. Compliance with International Refugee Obligations
During the Cold War,35 Western nations had several reasons to be satisfied
with the generalized and abstract 1967 refugee definition which was not
limited by dateline, continent, or other group designation.36 In 1951, there
were 1.5 million refugees,37 as opposed to today's figure of over 27.42 mil-
lion asylum seekers and internally displaced persons who are unable to
cross borders because of war and persecution in their homelands.38 Dur-
ing the Cold War, only a handful of people succeeded in escaping "Iron
Curtain" countries. The Western industrialized nations39 did not doubt
34. 1951 Convention, supra note 8, art. 33, para. 1.
35. A dramatic alteration in East-West refugee movements occurred in 1989 when
the Berlin Wall, a potent symbol of the Cold War rivalry, was dismantled. The elimina-
tion of physical barriers between Eastern and Western Europe resulted in an explosion
of migration from Communist countries in the East. See LoEScHER, supra note 4, at 22.
See also Bimal Ghosh, The Exodus That Could Explode, FiN. TNa.s, Jan. 23, 1991, at 15.
In December 1991, the Soviet Union formally dissolved into twelve independent repub-
lics. The Western allies, including the United States, recognized the Russian Federation
as the legal successor state to the U.S.S.R. Although the Soviet military threat to Europe
had diminished since the revolutionary events of 1989, the final disintegration of the
Soviet Union effectively signaled the end of the Cold War. See Michael Wines, End of the
Soviet Union, N.Y. TnvAs, Dec. 26, 1991, at Al. See also infra note 61.
36. See generally Paul Weis, Convention Refugees and De Facto Refugees, in AFncAN
RFFuGEES AND THE LAw 15 (G6ran Melander & Peter Nobel eds., 1978). In reference to
the formulation of the 1967 refugee definition, Weis notes:
As one who has participated in the drafting of the convention, I can say that the
drafters did not have specific restrictions in mind when they used this terminol-
ogy. Theirs was an effort to express in legal terms what is generally considered
as a political refugee. The Convention was drafted at a time when the cold war
was at its height. The drafters thought mainly of the refugees from Eastern
Europe and they had no doubt that these refugees fulfilled the definition they
had drafted.
Id. at 15.
37. LOESCHER, supra note 4, at 9.
38. Refugee Digest, supra note 5, tbl. 1. This figure includes refugees (14.48 mil-
lion), returnees (5.42 million), internally displaced persons (3.98 million), and "others"
(3.5 million). "Others" includes individuals who are outside their country but who have
not been formally recognized as refugees. This definition encompasses persons who
have been granted protection on a temporary basis or for humanitarian (non-Conven-
tion) reasons. An example would be the UNHCR-assisted victims in the former
Yugoslavia.
39. For purposes of this Note, these nations include Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Secretariat for Inter-
governmental Consultations estimates that 660,600 asylum applications were processed
in these countries in 1991 alone. LoascHE, supra note 4, at 74.
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the seriousness of the claims of such individuals 40 since they had risked
their lives to flee the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet bloc.4 1 The numbers
remained low for years, and the credibility problems associated with cur-
rent asylum claims were virtually nonexistent because of the unquestiona-
ble political persecution in the countries of origin.42 In fact, the United
States used refugees to enhance its international image as the benign super-
power by offering refuge to escapees from the "evil" Soviet empire.43 Fur-
thermore, expense and distance assured that many refugees from Asia and
Africa would not attempt a large-scale migration to the West. Finally,
because the Communist governments strictly controlled the dissemination
of information, many Eastern Europeans were not aware of the economic
opportunities and freedoms that existed in Western Europe and the United
States.44
Although the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol, its domestic
refugee policy was largely inconsistent with the requirements delineated in
the 1951 Convention.45 The Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.) 46
established procedures which were used discriminatorily to favor persons
from hostile nations. The I.N.A. provided the U.S. Attorney General with
the discretion to withhold deportation in cases where an alien would face
"physical persecution" upon return to the home state.47 Under the I.N.A.,
40. Martin, supra note 26, at 757 ("If someone had risked his life to escape the East's
barbed wire, or had put Up with the privations of refugee camps elsewhere in the world.
it seemed churlish to doubt the seriousness of the claim.").
41. In particular, the United States accepted large numbers of refugees from Eastern
Europe, including Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the U.S.S.R. In the
Western Hemisphere, the majority of refugees were fleeing communist regimes in Cuba
and Nicaragua. From 1960 to 1967, 185,487 refugees from Cuba were granted admis-
sion into the United States. After the U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam, the
number of refugees from Indochina soared, totaling 290,075 during the period from
1975 to 1979. Refugees from the Peoples Republic of China, which was not considered
part of the Soviet bloc, were also admitted in relatively large numbers throughout the
years following the 1949 Communist Revolution in that country. CONG. RES. SEgvicE,
96TH CONG., 1sr SEss., WORLD REFUGEE CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY's
RESPONSE, REPORT TO THE CoMMITTEE ON THE JUDIcIARY 213 (1979) [hereinafter WORLD
REFUGEE CMIss].
42. See David A. Martin, The New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEw ASYLUM SEEIERS: REFU-
GEE LAW IN THE 1980s 1, 9-11 (David A. Martin ed., 1988).
43. See generally JOSEPH CERQUONE, UNCERTAIN HAaORS: THE PLIGHT OF THE
VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE 5 (1987) (emphasizing the distinctly "Cold War flavor" of U.S.
refugee policy); BARBARA M. YARNoLD, REFUGEES WrrHotrr REFUGE FORMATION AND
FAILED IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. PoLrTCAL ASYLUM POLICY IN THE 1980's 5-20 (1990) (dis-
cussing how U.S. decision-makers were overwhelmingly influenced by whether an alien
was from a hostile, i.e., Communist, country of origin).
44. See Martin, supra note 26, at 757.
45. Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, U.S. law contained no general definition of a
refugee. See Ira J. Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 865,
874-75 (1982). There were also no statutory provisions for asylum. Although the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) promulgated asylum regulations, these proce-
dures were haphazardly applied. Id. at 875 n.61.
46. Pub. L. No. 82414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1525 (1994)).
47. The physical persecution standard was inconsistent with the 1951 Convention
requirements. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. In 1965, Congress amended
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the Attorney General also possessed authority to "parole" aliens temporar-
ily into the United States "for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed
strictly in the public interest."48 In practice, the executive branch utilized
this power to bring in persons fleeing communist countries.
4 9
The Refugee Act of 1980 sought to eliminate the discrimination in U.S.
practice by enacting into law a comprehensive definition of refugee.5 0 The
1980 Act, which also limits the use of the parole power,"1 nonetheless per-
mits the executive branch to establish annual parole programs.52 This new
provision, in addition to placing an emphasis upon the discretionary
aspect of asylum,' 3 perpetuates the Cold War mentality that foreign policy
considerations should control refugee determinations.'
4
the statute, and "physical persecution" was replaced by "persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion." Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11, 79 Stat. 918 (1965) (amending
8 U.S.C. § 1253) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994)). This change was made
despite the fact that the United States had not formally acceded to the Convention and
would not do so until it adopted the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees in 1968. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 9. However, even under this new stan-
dard, the Attorney General could favorably exercise discretion only if a particular alien
faced a "clear probability of persecution." See, e.g., Matter ofJoseph, 13 . & N. Dec. 70,
72 (BIA 1968); Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1003 (1968); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967). Aliens from noncom-
munist countries had to satisfy a high standard of proof to successfully petition the
government to withhold their deportation. See, e.g., Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d
155 (3d Cir. 1976); Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970).
48. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(d)(5) (1952) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1994)). The "parole" power came to be used far beyond the scope
for which it was originally intended, Le., for aliens who required immediate medical
attention or whose presence was required as a witness or for purposes of prosecution.
See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1653, 1706. However, individuals seeking refuge from communist nations were the pri-
mary beneficiaries of this provision. See Kurzban, supra note 45, at 870-71.
49. See generally WoRID REFuGEE Casis, supra note 41.
50. Section 201 of the Refugee Act of 1980 defines as a refugee:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality ... and who
is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980) (amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)).
51. The Refugee Act of 1980 limited the use of parole to a case-by-case basis. See 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B) (1994).
52. This provision authorizes the President to designate annually the number of ref-
ugees and persons of special humanitarian concern from specific geographic locations
who may enter the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (1994).
53. In 1982, the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the discretionary denial of
asylum to an alien who had established likelihood of persecution. Matter of Salim, 18 .
& N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982). Arguably, this decision has resulted in the frequent denial of
asylum as a matter of discretion. See Arthur C. Helton, The Proper Role of Discretion in
Political Asylum Determinations, 22 SAN Dm,o L. REv. 999, 1000 (1985).
54. In the years immediately following passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, less than
five percent of the admissions under the annual parole program came from noncom-
munist nations. See Kurzban, supra note 45, at 879-80 (suggesting that the 1980 Act
"institutionalizes political choice as the primary criterion for allocating refugee
admissions").
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In 1990, the Foreign Operations Act highlighted the double standard
in asylum decisions." Under this Act,"6 Soviet Jews or Evangelical Chris-
tians, Ukrainian Catholics, and selected Vietnamese, Laotians, and
Cambodians qualified as refugees if they offered a credible fear of persecu-
tion as opposed to the more rigorous standard of well-founded fear.57 Sim-
ilarly, the Immigration Act of 1990 indirectly identified refugees from
Poland, Hungary, Panama, and Nicaragua as individuals who had uprooted
themselves in order to flee persecution, and who should not be repatriated
simply because of the rapid democratic changes which had taken place in
those countries.5 8 This provision is another illustration of congressional
preference for refugees fleeing states that were hostile to the United
States.59
II. The Emerging Standard: Protectionism in Europe and America
Though the 1951 Refugee Convention was itself a "child of the Cold
War,"60 the instrument remains relevant today, and its advocates face even
greater challenges following the demise of the Soviet Union. Significant
changes generated by the end of the Cold War have triggered mass move-
ments of people across the globe. In 1989, a flood of refugees from East to
West Germany helped bring down the Berlin Wall.6 1 The ethnic conflict in
55. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-167, 103 Stat. 1195 (1989) [hereinafter Foreign Operations Act].
56. Foreign Operations Act § 599(D).
57. "Well-founded fear" is the standard adopted by the 1951 Convention, and codi-
fied by the United States in the 1980 Refugee Act. See supra notes 32, 50 and accompa-
nying text. By establishing a "credible basis for concern" standard for certain groups of
asylum seekers, Congress bestowed preferential treatment. A credible basis for concern
is established if the alien asserts that a "similarly situated individual, in his or her geo-
graphic locale" has been persecuted or the alien has "knowledge, either from having read
of or heard of... [persecution] as affecting persons in the same category residing else-
where in the home country." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 344, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
CONG. REc. H8495, H8515 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1989).
58. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 104(d), 104 Stat. 4978, 4985(1990).
59. By selectively relaxing refugee standards to accommodate certain groups for ide-
ological reasons, the United States not only violates the spirit of the 1951 Convention,
but it also contravenes Article 3 of the Convention, which requires contracting states to
"apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to...
country of origin." 1951 Convention, supra note 8, art. 3.
60. Pierre Bertrand, An Operational Approach to International Refugee Protection, 26
CoiRNM_ INT'L LJ. 495, 498 (1993).
61. On September 10, 1989, Hungary opened its border with Austria to allow East
German refugees, gathered at the West German embassy in Budapest, to reach the West.
East German President Erich Honecker subsequently permitted refugees in the Prague
and Warsaw embassies to board trains for West Germany. He then, however, banned
visa-free travel to Czechoslovakia out of fear that East German citizens would use that
country as an escape route. In response to several large political protests during the
month of October, the East German government eventually eased travel restrictions on
October 24, 1989, thereby allowing East German citizens to enter Czechoslovakia. On
November 4, Czechoslovakia opened its borders with West Germany, while 500,000 peo-
ple demonstrated for democracy in the streets of East Berlin. Within five days, East
Germany officially opened its western borders, resulting in the first major exodus since
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Bosnia-Herzogovina, a direct ramification of the fall of communism in East-
ern Europe,62 has produced hundreds of thousands of bona fide refugees
with strong claims to asylum. 63 Finally, as recently as August 1994, the
United States found itself confronted with another mass refugee flow from
Cuba. During the height of the crisis, the United States was providing shel-
ter to over 25,000 Cuban refugees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
64 Most
of the refugees attributed their departure to a sense of hopelessness about
the island's future under the leadership of its long-time dictator, Fidel Cas-
tro.6 5 Cuban government economists cite the collapse of the Soviet bloc
and the consequent end of economic support as the main cause of Cuba's
economic woes.6 6
Such mass refugee movements complicate immigration policies. Both
Western Europe and the United States are faced with refugees from areas
where extreme poverty is compelling an increasing number of people to
migrate. Growing economic disparity between industrialized nations and
the Third World are forcing Western States to work towards the creation of
appropriate international mechanisms to handle this new phase in interna-
tional migration. For example, many Eastern Europeans are discontent
with the hardships associated with the structural adjustments to free-mar-
ket economies and are taking advantage of their proximity with the West.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the iron grip has been relaxed and
the self-verifying character of refugee claims has lost some of its clarity. As
a result, signatories to the Refugee Convention are increasingly questioning
the wisdom of their earlier commitments under international law. Specifi-
cally, Western nations have responded to these global changes with three
different approaches: (1) reformation of liberal asylum laws, (2) interdic-
tion of asylum seekers on the high seas, and (3) humanitarian intervention
in the source country. These attempts at solving the refugee problem have
met with varied levels of success.
A. The Rise of Nationalism and the Challenge to Open Borders in the
European Union
The move toward European integration may not be beneficial for non-EU
nationals hoping to settle in the European Union. In fact, the recently
signed Dublin Convention,6 7 the 1985 Schengen Agreement, and the 1990
Schengen Convention 68 in some ways reflect a growing nationalistic fervor
the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. See Ferdinand Protzman, Thousands Swell Trek to the
West by East Germans, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 12, 1989, at Al; Clamour in the East: A Singular
Month Produces an Exodus, N.Y. TnIEs, Nov. 10, 1989, at A16.
62. See Loa-scHmn, supra note 4, at 25 (discussing connection between ethnic conflict
in the former Yugoslavia and the end of the Cold War).
63. Refugees: Keep Out, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1992, at 64.
64. Paul Lewis, Cuba Vows to End Exodus in Return for a Rise in Visas, N.Y. TIMes,
Sept. 10, 1994, at Al.
65. Tim Golden, A Dubious Pact, N.Y. Tmms, Sept. 10, 1994, at A4.
66. Id.
67. Dublin Convention, supra note 11.
68. Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 10.
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within the countries of Western Europe. Although the agreements ostensi-
bly advocate free trade, and thus appear adverse to a nationalist agenda,
they also provide a strong weapon against undesirable immigration into
the EU. 6
9
The EU nationalism which emerges from the Schengen and Dublin
Conventions directs its "fear" of foreigners 7° against the asylum seeker. As
defined by one commentator, nationalism is "a political principle which
holds that 'foreigners' . . . have (or should have) no right under law to
become citizens or to challenge the economic, political, and cultural domi-
nance of citizens/nationals." 71 Because of these anti-foreigner sentiments,
members of the EU that are comfortable with the concept of internal free
movement are reluctant to cede sovereignty over the politically charged
issues of non-EU immigration and asylum.72 The European approach to
these concerns involves the establishment of a legal framework which
69. The Schengen and Dublin Conventions grant the citizens of EU Member States
unrestricted freedom of movement within the Union, but condition this freedom upon
the adoption by each state of visa requirements and carrier sanctions intended to regu-
late the entry of foreigners into the EU. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. In
addition, these conventions assign responsibilities for asylum determinations to the
entry state and require EU members to defer to the decision of that state. Because a sole
state is responsible for handling an asylum request, the ability of the asylum seeker to
choose a state with more liberal asylum laws is greatly reduced. See infra note 77 and
accompanying text.
70. This "fear" of foreigners reflects the fact that Europeans have come to view for-
eigners as "threats to regional stability and security." James C. Hathaway, Harmonizing
for Whom? The Devaluation of Refugee Protection in the Era of European Economic Integra-
tion, 26 CoPaNEa INr'L UJ. 719, 720 (1993). In addition, there is "a pervasive belief that
the cultural and racial heterogeneity which accompanies immigration jeopardizes Euro-
pean identity and solidarity." Id. at 720. See also W.R. B6hning, Integration and Immi-
gration Pressures in Western Europe, 130 h'rr'. LAB. REv. 445 (1991). The fear of
foreigners may also be rationalized by a concern that foreigners will compete with citi-
zens for scarce jobs and housing. See Craig R. Whitney, Europeans Struggle to Balance
New Muslim Immigrants and Old Ways, N.Y. TIwms, May 6, 1995, at A4. But cf. DAunit.E
JOLY & CLivE NEIrI.TON, REruGE.s ni EUROPE 13 (1990) ("Economic recession and
unemployment have often been put forward as an explanation for this [restrictionist]
trend, but by itself it does not seem to be a sufficient explanation: Norway became one
of the strictest countries for asylum-seekers ... at a time when there was practically no
unemployment.").
71. Daniel Kanstroom, The Shining City and the Fortress: Reflections on the "Euro-
Solution" to the German Immigration Dilemma, 16 B.C. INT'I & CowP. L REv. 201, 230
(1993).
72. See Kay Hailbronner &J6rg Polakiewicz, Non-EC Nationals in the European Com-
munity: The Need for a Coordinated Approach, 3 DuKE J. Cow. & hLrr'n L. 49, 50-55
(1992) (discussing reluctance of member states to cede sovereignty with regard to
migration policy). See also Alan Cowell, Seven European Union Nations Form a Passport-
Free Zone, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 27, 1995, at A6 (noting that passport-free zone may make it
simpler for unlawful job-seekers and criminals to traverse Western Europe once they
gain entry to any country within the Schengen group). Immigration and asylum are not
the only issues which have sparked debate among European leaders. The United King-
dom has recently backed away from the political and monetary union envisioned in the
Maastricht treaty. Specifically, Prime Minister Major has expressed reluctance to join a
single European Union currency by 1997. See John Darnton, Major Turns Cool to British
Links with European Union, N.Y. Trwiss, Feb. 5, 1995, at A10. One author refers to Euro-
pean integration as an erosion of state sovereignty which has "sparked a backlash in
which traditional nationalist elements have combined with economic interests who fear
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seeks to insulate EU Member States from the potentially harmful effects
caused by a massive influx of people from non-Union countries.73
To further the economic and political goals of the EU, which include
the free movement of persons, transparency of the labor market, and polit-
ical unity, Western European leaders decided to harmonize immigration
and asylum policies.74 The decision to implement a coordinated policy
was also supported by a growing consensus within the EU that immigra-
tion was "the most serious problem facing Europe."75 Certain scholars,
however, have argued that the Western European fear of foreigners has
resulted in a restriction of refugee protection under these recent agree-
ments.76 For example, the Schengen Convention imposes visa require-
ments on the nationals of most lesser developed countries and imposes
penalties upon carriers which transport asylum seekers not in possession
of the requisite visa.77 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees has criticized such measures for tending to increase the risk of refoule-
ment.78 Both the Schengen and Dublin Conventions also assume that the
treatment a refugee claimant receives in one signatory state reasonably dis-
charges the duty of any other. In other words, states may legitimately rely
upon each other's asylum decisions.7 9 This reliance raises legal questions
as to a State's obligations under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention,
which imposes a duty upon each state to independently implement its
responsibilities under international law.8 0
Another indication of the devaluation of refugee protection in Europe
is the recent amendment to the German Constitution's liberal guarantee of
a right to asylum.8 1 In particular, the escalating number of asylum seekers
that the removal of protective barriers will hurt their position and privileges." GmEON
GorraEB, NATION AGAINST STATE 17 (1993).
73. See generally Gil Loescher, The European Community and Refugees, 65 r'r. Ar.
617 (1989) (arguing that an asylum policy based on deterrence weakens refugee
protection).
74. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, Declaration on Asylum, 31 LLM.
247, 373 (identifying harmonization of asylum policies as an aim of the European
Conference).
75. Refugees: Keep Out, supra note 63, at 64.
76. See generally Hathaway, supra note 70 (suggesting that under the guise of harmo-
nization, the EU governments have renounced their commitments to refugee protection
and the principle of nonrefoulement).
77. Schengen Convention, supra note 10, art. 26.
78. The risk of refoulement is increased by forcing carriers to verify visas and other
travel documentation. These visa requirements do not distinguish between asylum seek-
ers and other aliens. By essentially placing responsibility for asylum decisions in the
hands of individuals who are untrained in the procedures of refugee principles and
motivated by economic rather than humanitarian considerations, these provisions vio-
late the spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
79. Report of the European Commission on Immigration Law, PAm.. Ettr. Doc. (SEC
1857) 5 (1991).
80. 1951 Convention, supra note 8, art. 33.
81. GG art. 16a(2). Prior to the Amendment, the provision that "persons persecuted
on political grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum" was applied liberally by the German
courts. See Sam Blay & Andreas Zimmerman, Recent Changes in German Refugee Law: A
Critical Assessment, 88 AM. J. TL L 361, 362 (1994).
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from Eastern Europe led to a dramatic increase in the number of asylum
applications to Germany.82 German politicians claimed that most asylum
seekers were economic migrants or criminals without legitimate claims for
asylum who were abusing the liberal provisions of the German Constitu-
tion.83 At the time, Germany was in the midst of an economic recession
and was struggling with the rising costs of reunification. These combined
factors resulted in public resentment, manifested by increased violence
directed primarily against asylum seekers. In 1992, there were more than
2,200 reported cases of violence against foreigners.8 4
In order to preserve a law that would protect applicants in genuine
need of asylum while erecting a barrier against large influxes of foreigners,
Germany enacted a constitutional amendment. 85 The altered law retains
the right of asylum for the politically persecuted, but considerably limits
the scope of that right. In particular, the amendment imposes restrictions
based upon (1) entry from a Member State of the European Union, (2)
entry from another state where application of the Refugee Convention and
the European Convention on Human Rights is assured, and (3) entry from
places designated as safe countries of origin.8 6 In other words, applicants
who enter Germany from States that, at a minimum, comply with the Refu-
82. As of October 1992, Germany was receiving approximately 50,000 refugees per
month, resulting in an annual total of 438,191. This mass influx accounted for a 71%
increase in refugee applicants from 1991. Blay & Zimmerman, supra note 81, at 361.
83. Gerald L. Neuman, Buffer Zones Against Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and the Ger-
man Asylum Amendment, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 503, 514 & nn.75-77 (1993).
84. European Topics, INT'L HERALD Tam., March 18, 1993, at 6.
85. GG art. 16a.
86. The relevant portions of the Amendment state:
(1) Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum.
(2) Paragraph 1 may not be invoked by persons who enter from a member state
of the European Communities or from a third country where the application of
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR is guar-
anteed. Countries outside the European Communities to which sentence I
applies shall be determined by law, subject to the approval of the Bundesrat. In
such cases deportation measures may be carried out regardless of an appeal.
(3) A law subject to the approval of the Bundesrat may determine the states
whose legal situation, application of the law and general political situation seem
to ensure that there is no political persecution or inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment. An alien originating in such a state will not be considered
to be politically persecuted unless he produces reasons why he is politically
persecuted contrary to the presumption of sentence 1.
(4) In cases arising under paragraph 3, deportation measures will only be sus-
pended by a court if there are serious doubts about the legality of the measure.
This also applies to deportation measures in other manifestly unfounded cases.
In that regard the scope of review can be limited and subsequent argument dis-
regarded. Details shall be prescribed by statute.
(5) Paragraphs 1 to 4 are without prejudice to treaties between member states
of the European Communities or between member states and third states that
make arrangements, with due regard to the obligations under the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, whose application is guaranteed by
the parties to these treaties, for the examination of applications for asylum,
including the reciprocal recognition of asylum decisions.
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gee Convention and adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights
will not be granted political asylum. This approach takes advantage of the
wording of the Refugee Convention which does not preclude deportation to
a country where the refugee will be safe from both persecution and refoule-
ment.87 Though the concept of safe countries of origin does not necessar-
ily contravene international law, it seems to disregard the spirit of the
Refugee Convention. The German approach is consistent with the broader
European attempts to structure a legal framework for refugee law which
restricts access to asylum. 88
B. The Fear of Refugees: Haitian Boat Interdiction
Concerns about the rapidly increasing number of asylum seekers are not
unique to Europe. Although the U.S. solution differs in form from that of
the EU, the underlying policy objectives are quite similar. The U.S. policy
of interdiction on the high seas came under close scrutiny during the Bush
Administration. In September 1991, the elected president of Haiti, Rev.
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was ousted from power by a military coup.8 9 In the
wake of this takeover, the number of asylum seekers from Haiti to the
United States swelled to new heights.90 This dramatic increase was due
partially to the harsh repression of Aristide supporters by the military lead-
Id.
87. The 1951 Convention provides that contracting states may not "impose penal-
ties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from
a territory where their life or freedom was threatened ... enter or are present in their
territory without authorization." 1951 Convention, supra note 8, art. 31. See supra note
34 and accompanying text. Germany has read this provision to mean that if asylum
seekers do not come directly from their State of origin, where they may be subject to
persecution, the prospective receiving State may impose certain sanctions. However,
since the 1951 Convention does not restrict a refugee to a particular State of refuge, one
can argue that a refugee is not precluded from applying for asylum in a third State by
merely traveling through a State other than their State of origin. According to one com-
mentator, the implications of the German interpretation are considerable:
To be considered for asylum under the new German law, a person must travel
directly from the state of persecution to a German port. Since Germany is virtu-
ally surrounded by secure states, the only way the asylum seeker can reach Ger-
many directly is by air or by sea. As almost 90 percent of all asylum seekers in
Germany come by land through one of its neighbors, most of them will not be
considered for, let alone granted, the right of asylum.
Blay & Zimmermann, supra note 81, at 369.
88. Since the amendment was enacted, the number of foreigners seeking asylum in
Germany has decreased by more than 70% from 438,191 applications in 1992 to
127,210 in 1994. German Supreme Court Reviews Asylum Laws, Ratrrms, Nov. 21, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
89. See Haiti's Military Assumes Power After Troops Arrest the President, N.Y. Tnams,
Oct. 1, 1991, at Al.
90. Between September 30 and November 25, 1991, the United States interdicted
4,530 Haitians on the high seas. Bill Frelick, Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return: First
Asylum and First Principles of Refugee Protection, 26 Comma INT'L LJ. 675, 686 (1993).
By August 1994, the United States had provided shelter for more than 21,000 Haitians at
the U.S. military installation in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Larry Rohter, U.S. Starts the
Return of Haitians from Guantanamo, N.Y. Tmas, Jan. 7, 1995, at A3.
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ers.91 However, many fled the island because of the severe economic hard-
ships resulting from an embargo imposed by the Organization of American
States (OAS). 92 On May 23, 1992, President Bush ordered the U.S. Coast
Guard to interdict all boats coming from Haiti.93 The passengers were to
be returned to Port-au-Prince without any inquiry as to possible refugee
claims. This policy was a direct way of thwarting the refugee flow, but it
was of questionable legality under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. 94
The rationale behind President Bush's order was based partly upon
economic concerns similar to those confronting the European Union.
Most immigrants arrive in the United States with little money and few
skills, thus imposing a financial burden upon the states in which they set-
tle.95 In Florida alone, the cost of education, medical care, incarceration,
and other public services for immigrants is estimated at 2.5 billion dollars
a year.96
Nationally, about 150,000 of 900,000 legal immigrants each year are
refugees and asylum seekers.97 Because these immigrants are not evenly
distributed, states such as Florida, California, New York, and Texas bear a
huge portion of the costs. 98 In addition, there is a growing number of ille-
gal aliens who cost taxpayers in these states more than one billion dollars a
year.99 For this reason, Florida was joined by several other states, includ-
ing California and Texas, in filing suit against the federal government for
the money it has spent on public assistance for these immigrants. 100 On
91. See Pamela Constable, As Political Crackdown Widens in Haiti, U.S. Returns 272
More Refugees, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 1992, at 2 (detailing the harassment of Aristide
supporters and curtailment of press freedoms in Haiti since the coup).
92. Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, OAS MRE/Res.1/91 (Oct. 3,
1991); Support for Democracy in Haiti, OAS MRE/Res. 2/91 (Oct. 8, 1991).
93. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
94. Whether the Coast Guard's interception of Haitian refugees on the high seas
contravened domestic and international law was litigated in the federal courts. The Elev-
enth and Second Circuits reached contrary conclusions on this issue. Haitian Refugee
Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992);
Haitian Centers Councilv. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2549
(1993). The Supreme Court addressed the legality of interdiction in Sale v. Haitian Cen-
ters Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). See infra note 106 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court decision in Sale upholding interdiction policy as legal under
U.S. and international law).
95. Lizette Alvarez, Immigration: A Contentious Topic, ST. PETERSBURG Timas, June 14,
1994, at 1A.
96. Immigrants Cause Unfair Burden, Governor Says, TIMES-PicAYIu, , Mar. 14, 1994,
at A4.
97. Alvarez, supra note 95, at 1A.
98. A 1994 report by the Center for Immigration Studies estimated that immigrants
generated a net national deficit of $29.1 billion in 1992. A Flickering Torch, SUN SE'rrl-
E. (Fort Lauderdale), Oct. 30, 1994, at 4H.
99. Id.
100. The district court dismissed Florida's plea for relief from the costs associated
with illegal immigration on December 19, 1994. Governor Lawton Chiles referred to the
decision as a "temporary setback" and indicated the state's intention to appeal. See
Mireya Navarro, Florida's Plea for Immigration Relief Fails, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1994, at
A20. A U.S. district court in California similarly dismissed the California lawsuit, hold-
ing that only Congress and the President can decide how to allocate federal funds on
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November 8, 1994, California residents, disgruntled with lenient immigra-
tion policies, voted in favor of Proposition 187, an initiative which denies
public benefits such as education, welfare, and most health care to illegal
immigrants.101
Furthermore, President Bush's 1992 Executive Order reflected the
increasing popularity of a protectionist agenda in American politics. This
"Americanism" was a major factor in the 1992 presidential election.
Throughout his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination,
challenger Pat Buchanan criticized the Bush Administration's inability to
block one of the largest waves of immigrants in U.S. history. 10 2 In his
speeches, Buchanan asked, "What happened to make America so vulgar
and coarse, so uncivil and angry?" 10 3 He also warned that it was no coinci-
dence "that racial and ethnic conflicts pervade our media when the racial
and ethnic character of the U.S. has changed more in four decades than in
the previous twenty."'1 4 For many people who live in the states bearing
the brunt of the immigration burden, these issues were a major concern
during the 1992 recession and remain so today.' 0 5
immigration problems. California was seeking $2.4 billion and is also appealing the
case. See Reynolds Holding, Bid to Recoup Immigration Costs Denied, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
14, 1995, at Al.
101. State of California Proposition 187, Nov. 8, 1994, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop.
187 (West) (codified in scattered sections of California's Penal, Welfare and Institutions,
Health and Safety, Education, and Government codes). A recent CNN/USA Today poll
showed that 62% of individuals polled wanted their states to eliminate benefits to
undocumented aliens. David LaGesse, Discontent Grows Toward Immigrants, SUN SI-M-
NEL (Fort Lauderdale), Jan. 8, 1995, at 4A. See also B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Anti-Alien
Movement Spreading in Wake of California's Measure, N.Y. TA'Es, Dec. 4, 1994, at Al
(discussing how California is reshaping U.S. immigration debate as "Proposition 187"
movements gain momentum in other states). Proposition 187 is under legal challenge.
In November 1994, a district court in California issued a temporary restraining order
blocking immediate enforcement of the initiative's bans on non-emergency medical, edu-
cational, and social services for illegal immigrants, and also ordered a temporary halt to
the initiative's requirement that police and government agencies report suspected illegal
immigrants to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the state attorney gen-
eral's office. See Paul Feldman &James Rainey, Parts of Prop. 187 Blocked by Judge, L.A.
TMms, Nov. 17, 1994, at Al; H. Eric Schockman, Why Prop. 187 Needs Judicial Review,
L.A. TmEs, Jan. 22, 1995, at B19. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court acted
appropriately in blocking most portions of Proposition 187 from taking effect prior to
an upcoming trial to determine its constitutionality. Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 59 F.3d
1002 (9th Cir. 1995).
102. See John Aloysius Farrell, Open Doors/Closing Minds, BosrON GLOBE, Feb. 23,
1992, at 61 (supporting Buchanan's view that if the current trend continues, the 1990s
may surpass the 1900s as the single biggest decade of immigration with more than a
million immigrants a year). In the 1996 presidential campaign, Pat Buchanan once
again put forth a nationalistic message, denouncing illegal immigration and supporting
protectionist trade policies. Adam Nagourney, Buchanan Refuses to Let Boos Spoil the
Fun, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 23, 1996, at A22; James Bennet, Buchanan, Exalted, Pushes Eco-
nomic Insecurity Theme, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1996, at Al.
103. Farrell, supra note 102, at 61 (quoting Buchanan).
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. See also Peter Passell, Ajob-Wage
Conundrum: Crises in Cuba and Haiti Resurrect Debate About Immigrants and Employment
in U.S., N.Y. TMEs, Sept. 6, 1994, at D1 (suggesting that more unskilled immigrants
mean lower wages and fewer low-end jobs for those already here).
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The policy of interdicting refugees in international waters-physically
preventing them from entering the United States-and returning them to
their home country was challenged in the American courts. In Sale v. Hai-
tian Centers Council, the Supreme Court held that neither the I.N.A. nor
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention limits the President's power to order
the Coast Guard to repatriate undocumented aliens intercepted on the high
seas.10 6 Nevertheless, many have criticized the Bush Administration policy
106. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). In Sale, the
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the interdicted Haitians had cogniza-
ble legal rights under U.S. domestic law or international law. The relevant U.S law is
Section 243(h)(1) of the I.N.A., which states: "The Attorney General shall not deport or
return any alien... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life
or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Respondents contended that the removal of the
words "within the United States" and the addition of the word "return" to this section
reflected the Congressional intent in 1980 to conform U.S. law with Article 33(1) of the
1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, assuring that the benefits of the section
applied extraterritorially (thus encompassing refugees intercepted on the high seas).
Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2558. Petitioners rejected this assertion, arguing that Section
243(h)(1) does not apply to actions of the President and Coast Guard on the high seas.
Id. The Court reasoned that because no I.N.A. provision authorizes exclusion or depor-
tation proceedings outside of the United States, Section 243(h)(1) cannot be interpreted
to limit the Attorney General's actions in places where she has no authority to conduct
such hearings. Id. at 2560. In the absence of a clear Congressional intent to the con-
trary, the Court will presume that the Act does not apply outside U.S. borders. Id. (cit-
ing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989)
('tWhen it desires to do so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the juris-
dictional reach of a statute.")). The statute, therefore, does not restrict the President's
authority to order the interdiction and repatriation of Haitians. The Court then charac-
terized the respondents definition of "return" as overly expansive, relying upon the U.S.
legal distinction between deportation and exclusion. By using both "deport" and
"return" in Section 253(h)(1), Congress must have intended "return" to signify exclusion
at a border. Otherwise Congress would have used the word "return" alone to cover both
deportation and exclusion proceedings. Id. The use of both terms thus "implies an
exclusively territorial application." Id.
The Court then addressed the international law issue. The relevant segment of Article
33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention reads: "No Contracting State shall expel or
return ('refouler') a refugee ... to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion .... " 1951 Convention, supra note
8, art. 33, para. 1. Interpreting this provision, the Court concluded that the phrase
"expel or return (refouler)" paralleled the phrase "deport or return" in I.N.A. Section
253(h)(1). Using the American legal distinction between deportation and exclusion, the
Court reasoned that "return" as used in the treaty must refer only to "the exclusion of
aliens who are merely on the threshold of initial inquiry." Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2563 (quot-
ing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 357 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)). Arguably, the
U.S. government would not have instituted a policy of interdiction without the belief that
these Haitians were indeed "on the threshold of initial entry." Id. at 2569 (Blackmun, J.
dissenting). This interpretation of "return" seems strained at best especially since the
Convention qualifies the term by placing "refouler" in parentheses. The Court conceded
that "refouler" is translated as "repulse" or "drive back," but then used the definition to
distinguish interdiction. "Return" connotes a defensive act of resistance at the border as
opposed to the active transportation of refugees to another destination. Id. at 2564.
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for undermining the spirit of the principle of nonrefoulement.' 0 7 In partic-
ular, the United States lost any moral high ground it may have held in
protesting the treatment of refugees by other governments.1 0 8 President
Bill Clinton, who had vehemendy opposed the Bush Administration's Hai-
tian refugee policy during the 1992 campaign,' 0 9 was also the subject of
criticism during the early stages of his presidency because of a post-elec-
tion reversal in his stance.1 10 Until the summer of 1994, the emerging
international approach to refugee crises, as evidenced first by a resurgent
nationalism in the EU and subsequently in a decision by America's highest
court, pandered to protectionist fears and advocated the use of restrictive
border controls.
C. The Clinton Doctrine: Humanitarian Intervention to Restore
International Security
During the summer of 1994, Fidel Castro provided President Clinton with
both a challenge and an opportunity. The Cuban leader opened his bor-
ders, allowing free exit to those who wished to brave the waters between
the Caribbean island and Miami, Florida."- Once it became clear that
Cuban officials would not restrain those seeking to leave by boat, the
United States was forced again to confront its much debated refugee pol-
icy." 2 This was an opportunity for the President to regain the approval of
107. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Haitian Asylum Seekers: Interdiction and Immi-
grants' Rights, 26 CommnL Ir'i.LJ. 695 (1993); David A. Martin, Interdiction, Interven-
tion, and the New Frontiers of Refugee Law and Policy, 33 VA. J. INt'L L. 473 (1993).
108. The U.S. State Department expressed dismay at the repatriation of Vietnamese
refugees by Hong Kong in December 1991, only to be confronted with questions about
U.S. interdiction of Haitian boat people. See Barbara Basler, Hong Kong Ousts More Boat
People, N.Y. TIMas, Dec. 11, 1991, at A16 (discussing repatriation of Vietnamese).
109. During his campaign for president, Bill Clinton stated:
I am appalled by the decision of the Bush Administration to pick up fleeing
Haitians on the high seas and forcibly return them to Haiti before considering
their claim to political asylum .... This process must not stand. It is a blow to
the principle of first asylum and to America's moral authority in defending the
rights of refugees around the world.
Clinton Continues Summary Return of Haitians: U.S. Lawyers Investigate In-Country
Processing, REFUGEE REP., Jan. 29, 1993, at 1, 2 (quoting then Presidential Candidate Bill
Clinton).
110. See, e.g., Frelick, supra note 90, at 688.
111. This was not the first time that South Florida's shores were flooded with Cuban
refugees. In 1980, the Carter Administration allowed an estimated 125,000 Cubans to
enter the United States. The "Mariel" Boatlift, named for the Cuban port of Mariel from
which the asylum seekers set off, changed the demography of Miami, whose residents
are currently over 60% Cuban. In addition, Mariel imposed an added cost on American
taxpayers because many of the refugees were in fact convicted criminals in Cuba who
were subsequently incarcerated in the United States. See Edward Cody, Florida Seeking
to Cope with Influx, WASH. Post, Dec. 15, 1984, at A12.
112. Arguably, U.S. foreign and trade policy toward Cuba was instrumental in caus-
ing the mass flow of refugees. Since 1960, the United States has maintained a strict
economic embargo against Cuba. In 1992, the Bush Administration increased economic
pressure on the Castro regime by passing the Cuban Democracy Act. These actions,
combined with Cuba's loss of its principal benefactor, the Soviet Union, have caused the
standard of living in Cuba to disintegrate even further. See Seth Borenstein, Immigration
Policy Needs Direction, SUN SENTL (Fort Lauderdale), Oct. 30, 1994, at 3S.
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critics who were gravely disappointed with his approach to the Haitian exo-
dus. Given the already exacerbated anti-immigrant politics in Florida dur-
ing an election year, 113 the Administration needed to act swiftly and it did.
By mid-September, over 30,000 Cubans had fled the island, nearly all of
whom were interdicted at sea and temporarily housed at Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base." 4 At that point, the Administration signed an agreement with
the Castro regime under which the United States agreed to accept at least
20,000 new Cuban immigrants each year in exchange for a guarantee that
immediate efforts be taken to reduce the outflow and number of unsafe
departures from the island.115 On May 2, 1995, the United States officially
announced a policy of summarily returning Cuban refugees to their home-
land. This policy marked a shift from the nine-month old practice of
directing Cuban refugees to Guantanamo Bay as well as from a three-dec-
ade old policy of granting free entry to individuals who sought relief from
the repressive regime of Fidel Castro.116
The Cuban situation exemplified the dire consequences of refugee
movements, and thus provided support for the President's decision to
threaten the Haitian military junta with the use of force. Throughout the
summer, the United States had been pressing the U.N. Security Council to
authorize military intervention in Haiti. In order to legitimate the restora-
tion of democracy under international law, the Clinton Administration
urged the Council to view the massive flow of refugees as a threat to inter-
national security in the region. On July 31, 1994, the U.N. Security Coun-
cil responded by passing Resolution 940 which authorized "Member States
... to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the
military leadership .... 1117 In a televised address to the nation on Septem-
113. See Richard L. Berke, Governor Chiles Seizes the Refugee Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
11, 1994, at A22 (suggesting that the Governor's efforts to stem the exodus and influ-
ence U.S. refugee policy would benefit him in an election year); Deborah Sharp, Action
on Cuba Could Pay Off For Chiles, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 1994, at 2A (emphasizing the
opposition of Florida voters to a government policy which gives Cuban refugees prefer-
ential treatment).
114. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
115. Under the agreement, the Administration set a minimum level of 20,000 visas
for Cuban immigration, and the Administration also agreed to issue entry visas for 500
close relatives of Cubans already living in the United States. In addition, for one year
only, the United States agreed to grant entry to all Cubans on the American immigration
waiting list. See Lewis, supra note 64, at Al. More than 200,000 Cubans, most of whom
did not flee the island in August 1994, applied for the 20,000 available visas. See What
Refuge for Refugees, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 5, 1995, at 2B. Consequently, only
5,000 of the 27,500 Cuban refugees who resided at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base were
granted entry in the first year of the accord. U.S. Meets Quota for 20,000 Visas in Cuban
Award, WASH. PosT, Aug. 22, 1995, at A9. The others remained in a limbo-like existence,
the victims of a shift in U.S. policy. Most of the refugees gradually gained entry to the
United States. OnJanuary 31, 1996, the U.S. government officially closed down the tent
cities which had been erected at Guantanamo a year and a half earlier. Mireya Navarro,
Last of Refugees From Cuba in '94 Flight Now Enter U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1996, at A8.
116. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Will Return Refugees to Cuba in Policy Switch, N.Y. TiMES,
May 3, 1995, at Al.
117. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(1994).
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ber 15, 1994, President Clinton referred to the prospect of an expanded
refugee crisis as a critical factor in his decision to impose an ultimatum on
the Haitian military junta.118 Fortunately, on September 19, a final diplo-
matic effort to avert a U.S. military invasion of Haiti was successful. 119
Negotiations resulted in an agreement which wouild restore President Aris-
tide to power. President Clinton subsequently ordered 20,000 U.S. troops
to Haiti for the purpose of supervising the transition in government. 120
During the months following Aristide's reinstatement as president, the
United States gradually reduced its military presence while transferring
principal control over the security mission to a combined U.N.-U.S. force
of 6,000 troops.121
III. Proposed Strategies of Response in the Post-Cold War World
In order to effectively handle the challenges of refugee movements in the
post-Cold War world, states must develop a comprehensive strategy
designed to deal with mass exodus emergencies. Because the confines of
the U.N. Charter as well as the legal obligations set forth in the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention restrict the number of feasible alternatives available, viable
solutions must address the possibility of altering the current legal struc-
ture. Two potential means of crisis management adopt this approach: (1)
amending the U.N. Charter in order to permit greater use of the Security
Council in refugee emergencies, and (2) reevaluating the principle of
nonrefoulement so as to legitimate interdiction under the Refugee Conven-
118. In his speech, President Clinton emphasized that
Three hundred thousand more Haitians, 5 percent of their entire population, are
in hiding in their own country. If we don't act, they could be the next wave of
refugees at our door. We will continue to face the threat of a mass exodus of
refugees and its constant threat to stability in our region and control of our
borders.
Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 WEEKaY CoMp. PREs. Doc. 1779, 1781 (Sept. 15,
1994).
119. President Clinton sent former U.S. PresidentJimmy Carter, retired Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia to
Haiti in a final diplomatic effort to avert U.S. military action. The President authorized
the emissaries to discuss arrangements for the peaceful departure of Haiti's ruling junta.
Douglas Jehl, Showdown With Haiti: Holding Off, Clinton Sends Carter, Nunn and Powell
to Talk to Haitian Junta, N.Y. Tmsas, Sept. 17, 1994, at Al. This final attempt at diplo-
macy resulted in an agreement which provided for the lifting of economic sanctions and
the embargo imposed on Haiti and the early "retirement" of certain Haitian military
officers who had been in de facto control of the nation. Mission to Haiti: Text of the
Agreement Averting U.S. Invasion of Haiti, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 20, 1994, at A12 [hereinafter
Haiti Agreement].
120. At the time the agreement was reached, the United States had positioned twenty
warships within striking distance of the island. Throughout the talks, the emissaries
communicated to the junta the fact that a U.S. invasion was imminent and that the
damage which would be inflicted on the Haitian people in the event of a military opera-
tion would be severe. Elaine Sciolino, Mission to Haiti: Diplomacy, N.Y. TMEs, Sept. 20,
1994, at Al. The agreement reached with the junta provided for a U.S. military mission
to supervise the transition in power. See Haiti Agreement, supra note 119, at A12.
121. See F. Andy Messing, Jr., Perspective on Haiti: A Peacekeeping Job Half-Done, LA.
Twors, Feb. 21, 1995, at B5 (criticizing the U.S. peacekeeping effort in Haiti and discuss-
ing the continued costs of restoring President Aristide to power).
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tion. A third proposal adheres to the spirit and law of both the U.N. Char-
ter and Refugee Convention by advocating the establishment of strong
emergency relief mechanisms at the regional level.
A. Reconciling Humanitarian Intervention with the U.N. Charter
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter preserves the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations.122 However, the U.N. Charter contains no exception for
humanitarian intervention, and the International Court of Justice has
refused to read the provisions governing the use of force expansively. 123 A
close analysis of the Clinton Doctrine as applied in Haiti reveals the legal
and practical problems associated with humanitarian intervention.
1. A Case Study: The Threat of Military Intervention in Haiti
The dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War
illustrate how the international political scene is susceptible to rapid and
revolutionary change. However, two enduring elements of world politics
are the central role of force in international relations and the debate over
the conditions which are required for its legitimate use. There are three
main factors which make the use of force under the guise of humanitarian
intervention undesirable: (a) its illegality under the U.N. Charter, (b) the
great potential for its abuse by powerful nations, and (c) the lack of com-
mitment on the part of nations toward implementing such a policy. The
Clinton Administration's threat to invade Haiti under the authorization of
Security Council Resolution 940 presents an opportunity to examine each
of these issues.
a. The Legal Obstacle: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
There is language in the U.N. Charter which indicates that the Security
Council's authorization of intervention in Haiti was illegal. In Article 2(4),
all Member States agree to "refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations."124 In order for the Security Council to approve
military intervention, it must conclude that there has been a threat to inter-
national peace and security under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter. 125 In
Haiti's case, the idea that a tiny nation whose economy was in shambles
and whose military posed no threat at all to the surrounding region
threatened international peace and security is a difficult proposition to
defend. The official response by U.N. officials focused upon the desperate
122. U.N. CHaTER art. 51. See also infra text accompanying notes 132-38.
123. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, reprinted
in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986) (construing the prohibition in Article 2(4) broadly and the
exception in Article 51 narrowly). The International Court of Justice is the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations. U.N. CHArER art. 92.
124. U.N. CiArE art. 2, 1 4.
125. U.N. CHAlrTE art. 42.
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plight of Haitian refugees. 126 However, the Haitian exodus primarily
affected the United States, the world's only superpower with the world's
largest economy. A mass influx undoubtedly burdens certain segments of
society, but one cannot equate such costs with a threat to international
peace without severely undermining the intent of the Charter language. 127
The Council had never before considered the flow of refugees to constitute
such a threat, and arguably, its actions during the summer of 1994 were
based upon a deep concern over human rights abuses in Haiti. In fact,
Resolution 940 cites the "further deterioration of the humanitarian situa-
tion in Haiti" and the "systematic violation of civil liberties" as core reasons
behind the authorization of military intervention.1 28 This reasoning is
problematic because the U.N. Charter does not explicitly authorize the use
of force to ensure universal observance of human rights.3129
Champions of humanitarian intervention have argued that the refer-
ence to "Purposes" in Article 2(4) includes the advancement of human
rights.' 30 However, the Charter's history indicates otherwise. In fact, the
protection of sovereignty and the maintenance of world peace were the
supreme goals of the United Nations. To suggest differently "ignores per-
suasive evidence of a distinct hierarchy of purposes in the Charter as origi-
nally conceived."' 3 1
There are several reasons why humanitarian intervention is illegal
under the Charter. First, the promotion of human rights is only one orga-
nizational goal of the United Nations.132 If the founding members had
intended to rely upon coercive means as a possible method of implement-
ing all U.N. goals, they would not have specifically provided for only one
exception to Article 2(4), namely the self-defense provision of Article
51.133 Second, the founding Member States drafted the U.N. Charter in
126. S.C. Res 940, supra note 117 (citing the "desperate plight of refugees" as a reason
for authorizing intervention in Haiti).
127. The refugee justification is flawed in another sense as well. If a return to democ-
racy is certain to stop the flight, one can't help but wonder why Mexican citizens living
under a duly elected government continue to flood the cities of Texas and Southern
California.
128. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 117.
129. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
130. Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the
Ibos, in HuMANrrrA INTERvENnON ANM THE UNITED NATIONS 167-195 (Richard B. Lillich
ed., 1973).
131. TomJ. Farer, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, in LAw
AND FORCE IN THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ORDm 185, 190 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & DavidJ.
Scheffer eds., 1991).
132. The third stated purpose of the United Nations is:
To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion[.]
U.N. CHARTER art.l, cl 3 (emphasis added).
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also Theodor Meron, Commentary on Humanitarian
Intervention, in LAw AND FORCE IN THE Nmv INTERNATIONAL ORDER 212, 213 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch & DavidJ. Scheffer eds., 1991) (citing Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 LCJ. 14, in which
the I.CJ. determined that the only exception to Article 2(4) is Article 51).
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1945, its principal purpose being to end the scourge of war.134 The Mem-
ber States sent representatives to San Francisco with the shared hope that
safeguards would be implemented to protect against future acts of aggres-
sion.135 If their primary goal had not been to guarantee the protection of
sovereign nations from aggressors, the Permanent Members easily could
have chosen to give the Security Council coercive authority in connection
with all the principles and purposes of the United Nations. Instead, the
Security Council can legitimately use force only when there is a threat to
the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.' 36 In addition, a
majority of States rejected a proposal to include a Bill of Rights in the U.N.
Charter, indicating that they were unwilling to cede national sovereignty to
the organization.' 37 Finally, Article 2(7) of the Charter reinforces the idea
that the founding members were reluctant to give the United Nations
power over "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state."' 38
One can also construct a persuasive moral argument against humani-
tarian intervention. There is a moral duty not to interfere with a state
which is developing its policies through the process of self-determination.
Just as an individual deserves to have his moral choices respected by
others, a state is also a moral being capable of being autonomous in a
moral sense.1 39 Foreign intervention violates this autonomy. However,
several scholars believe that such an interpretation of the U.N. Charter
leaves human rights and freedoms significantly unprotected.' 40
b. Distinguishing Precedent: The Protection of U.S. Nationals in
Grenada and Panama
The motives and consequences of humanitarian intervention influence the
way in which the international community responds to the use of force.
Military operations in Grenada and Panama are two instances where the
134. See Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT 37 (Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations ed., 1989).
135. U.N. CHAuRm pmbl. Referring to the purpose of the Charter, one scholar stated:
[i]n the future, the only "just war" would be war against an aggressor-in self-
defense by the victim, in collective defense of the victim by others, or by all.
Nations would be assured independence, the undisturbed enjoyment of auton-
omy within their territory, and their right to be let alone.
Henkin, supra note 134, at 39.
136. U.N. CHRnm art. 39.
137. See Farer, supra note 131, at 191.
138. U.N. C~aRam art. 2, cl 7.
139. See generally G.F. HEGEL, THE PHILosoPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., 1965)
(articulating the notion of the moral personality of the State). See also J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OFJusncE 378 (1971) (suggesting that the consequence of equality of nations is
"the principle of self-determination, the right of a people to settle its own affairs without
the interference of foreign powers").
140. See, e.g., FERn u No TEsON, Hu NrrAmAN INTERVEMON: AN INQUIRY mo LAw
ANMon-R (1988); Hum'r~AIu INmvENTON AND THE UNI NATIONS (Richard B.
Lillich ed., 1973).
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international community denounced intervention.14 ' Although several
U.N. Member States condemned these unilateral military actions, U.S.
intervention in Grenada and Panama can be justified uider the Charter
more easily than Resolution 940.
i. The Decision to Invade Grenada
On October 12, 1983, a small militia group seized the Prime Minister of
Grenada and placed him under arrest.' 42 He and several members of his
cabinet were executed, leaving Grenada without a government and under
the de facto control of a paramilitary group who subsequently imple-
mented a shoot-to-kill curfew.' 43 Approximately one thousand U.S. citi-
zens were residing in Grenada at the time, eight hundred of whom were
medical students at St. George's University Medical School.144 In response
to these events, six members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States, joined by Barbados and Jamaica, urgently requested U.S. assistance
in a military operation to restore a democratically-elected government to
the island. 145 On October 23, President Reagan authorized the use of U.S.
military force in Grenada.146 In discussing the invasion, President Reagan
referred to Grenada as "a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major
military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy."147
Although the Reagan Administration proffered three legal arguments
to defend the American invasion of Grenada and subsequent restoration of
its democratic government, 148 one such principle alone presents a stronger
case for the Grenada intervention than the entire rationale behind sending
forces to Haiti. That principle was a bona fide concern on the part of the
executive branch that American students in Grenada were endangered by
the coup d'tat.149 The tone of the Revolutionary Military Council in con-
141. See Serious Events in the Republic of Panama, OAS CP/Res. 534(800/89), Dec. 22,
1989 (denouncing U.S. invasion of Panama); The Situation in Grenada, G.A. Res. 38/7,
U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Agenda Item 145, U.N. Doc. A/38/L.8 (1983) (condemning U.S.
military deployment to Grenada).
142. Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada, 19 WEmKL CoMW.
PREs. Doc. 1497, 1500-01 (Oct. 27, 1983) [hereinafter Grenada Address].
143. Id. at 1501.
144. Id.
145. For the text of the O.E.C.S. invitation, see WILuiA C. GiumoRE, THE GRENADA
INTERVENTION: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENATION 100 (1984).
146. Reagan later recalled in his memoir, "there was only one answer I could give to
... those six countries who [had] asked for our help." RoNA REAcAN, AN AmERCAN
LFE 450 (1990).
147. Grenada Address, supra note 142, at 1501.
148. The three arguments were: (1) protection of nationals, (2) collective action
under Article 52 of the U.N. Charter, and (3) the request to invade by lawful authority,
namely Grenadian Governor-General Paul Scoon. See Letter from Davis R. Robinson,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Professor Edward Gordon, Chairman of the
Grenada Committee of the American Bar Association's Section on International Law and
Practice (Feb. 10, 1984), in JOHN NORTON MooRE, LAw AND THE GRENADA MISSION 125-29
(1984).
149. See generally Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Decision to Invade Gre-
nada: A Ten-Year Perspective, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 765 (1993) (suggesting that the Reagan
Administration feared the possible use of the medical students as hostages).
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trol of Grenada was hostile. The head of the People's Revolutionary Army
had set a curfew, dosed the schools, and warned that "[a]nyone who seeks
to demonstrate or disturb the peace will be shot."' 5 0 The Reagan Adminis-
tration considered the protection of nationals to be a well-established
ground for the use of force."' Because the leadership on the island had
rejected a peaceful evacuation of the U.S. nationals, the landing of U.S.
military forces arguably could be justified on this basis. 152
ii. U.S. Military Intervention in Panama
The legality of U.S. military intervention again was questioned during the
1989 invasion of Panama."53 On December 15, 1989, General Manuel
Noriega declared that a state of war existed between the Republic of Pan-
ama and the United States of America.154 The following day, Panamanian
military forces killed a U.S. marine without reason.15 5 Following this
shooting and the reported threat of a "commando-style attack" against U.S.
personnel, the Bush Administration authorized "Operation Just Cause," a
military intervention involving the use of 24,000 U.S. troops."56
President Bush justified the deployment of troops to Panama as an
"exercise of the right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter."1" 7 Bush, following the precedent set by Ronald Reagan
in the Grenada intervention, emphasized that the lives and welfare of Amer-
ican citizens in Panama were at risk."58 In addition, President Bush cited
the U.S. interest in the Panama Canal and the Canal Treaties which permit-
ted U.S. intervention in order to "assure that the Panama Canal shall
remain open, neutral, secure and accessible ... ."159 Finally, the Adminis-
tration emphasized the need to bring Panama's leader, General Noriega, to
150. Id. at 776.
151. But see ALLAN GERSON, THE KIRKPATRICK MISSIoN 227 (1991) (suggesting that the
Grenada operation was really about a fear that the island might become "another Cuba"
and threaten its eastern Caribbean neighbors).
152. Beck, supra note 149, at 804; ANTHONY Ct.Rx ARND & RoBERTJ. BECK, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw & = USE OF FORCE BEYOND ma U.N. CHARTER PARADIGm 93-111 (1993).
153. Commentators have suggested that the primary goal behind the U.S. action was
the removal of a dictator, who had become increasingly hostile toward the United States,
and his replacement with the democratically elected Panamanian President Guillermo
Endara. Though the overall result of the intervention may have been to restore democ-
racy, commentators have argued that the U.N. Charter prohibits such action: "You can-
not justify the invasion of a foreign country on the grounds that you think its ruler is
wicked, because the most powerful countries could then just define their weaker oppo-
nents as wicked and crush them." Gwynne Dyer, Bush's Flouting of International Law
Must Be Condemned, CHi. Tam., Dec. 26, 1989, at 23.
154. See Series of Incidents Prompted Response, USA TODAY, Dec. 21, 1989, at 5A.
155. Id.
156. See Abraham F. Lowenthal, Are There Rules Just For Us?, L.A. TnAES, Dec. 22,
1989, at B7.
157. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
on United States Military Action in Panama, 25 WEE LY Comp. PRES. Doc. 1984, 1985
(Dec. 21, 1989).
158. Id.
159. Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.-Pan., U.S. Reservation, 33 U.S.T. 39,
41.
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justice on charges of drug trafficking, citing a Justice Department opinion
that U.S. forces have the legal power to go to foreign nations to arrest fugi-
tives wanted in the United States. 160
Some critics have labeled the use of force in these actions as blatant
aggression outlawed by the U.N. Charter. 16 1 Others have accepted the
humanitarian justification provided by the U.S. government, but nonethe-
less emphasize the fact that the U.N. Charter recognizes no such exception
to the use of force. 162 Despite widespread disapproval, these military oper-
ations, unlike the Haitian crisis, involved situations where U.S. nationals
were at risk, thus giving some credence to an Article 51 justification.16 3
c. The Hypocrisy of the Clinton Administration's Policy on Haiti
Judging from the active military role of the United States in Haiti, one
might conclude that armed intervention will be the rule rather than the
exception in the future. A closer examination of U.S. foreign policy indi-
cates that the opposite is true. Throughout this century, U.S. leaders have
experienced the recurring impulse to volunteer the services of their nation
as a world policeman. In the post-Cold War world, the ideological competi-
tion between the United States and Soviet Union has ended, but there is a
price for any victory.1 6 4 The West faces the challenge of confronting a
number of countries left without leadership, order, or governance. Somalia
is one example of a country in chaos,' 65 and Haiti is another. The United
160. See Robert Graham, U.S. Military Intervention: International Jurists Question
Grounds for American Action, FiN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1989, at 6.
161. See, e.g., MichaelJ. Berlin, U.S. Allies Join in Lopsided U.S. Vote Condemning Inva-
sion of Grenada, WASH. Post, Nov. 3, 1983, at Al.
162. See, .e.g., Vladimir Kartashkin, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in
LAw AND FORCE IN THE NEw -NTENArioNAu. O iwE 202, 204-05 (Lori Fisler Damrosch &
DavidJ. Scheffer eds., 1991).
163. The author has included this section of the Note in order to accentuate the con-
tradiction between the Haiti Resolution and the U.N. condemnation of U.S. military
intervention in Grenada and Panama. After considering the legal rationale offered by the
Reagan and Bush Administrations, one recognizes the inherent flaws in the Security
Council's analysis of the Haiti crisis.
164. See Patrick J. Buchanan, U.S. To Pay For And Enforce Peace Everywhere?, Hous.
CHRON., Sept. 14, 1993, at A17 (arguing that the end of the Cold War has led the United
States to add military commitments while downsizing military forces).
165. In December 1992, the lame duck Bush Administration committed U.S. ground
troops as part of a multinational force to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid to the war-
torn country of Somalia, which has been engaged in a clan-based civil war since 1991.
The war, in conjunction with a severe drought, caused a famine estimated to have killed
300,000 people within one year. Although the troops were initially scheduled to remain
in Somalia for one month, the humanitarian mission was extended by the Clinton
Administration. U.S. casualties mounted throughout the year. The Clinton foreign pol-
icy reached a crisis in October 1993 with the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers in a Mogadishu
street battle. U.S. reporters captured on film footage of Somalis dragging the body of a
U.S. soldier through the streets of the city. More than two dozen U.S. troops died in
Somalia, prompting an American withdrawal in March 1994 from the peace-keeping
operation. See Don Oberdorfer & Trevor Rowe, U.S. Offers Ground Troops for Interven-
tion in Somalia, WASH. Post, Nov. 26, 1992, at Al; Jane Perlez, U.S. Forces Arrive in"
Somalia on Mission to Aid the Starving, N.Y. TmEs, Dec. 9, 1992, at Al; Daniel Williams,
Joining the Pantheon of American Missteps, WASH. PosT, March 26, 1994, at A18 (compar-
Cornell International Law Journal
States eventually responded to the Haitian crisis by sending 20,000 troops
with the stated goal of restoring democracy. 16 6 However, if Haiti justified
military action, why did the United States wait four years to send a military
force into Bosnia?16 7 Likewise, why did the United States refuse to con-
tribute troops to the U.N. mission in Rwanda?168 In both cases, the atroci-
ing the Somalia intervention with U.S. "misadventures" in Vietnam and Lebanon). U.S.
Marines returned to Somalia in February of 1995 to provide a protective shield for the
final retreat of U.N forces from that country. Almost 2000 U.S. troops participated in
the mission. The U.N. withdrawal marked the end of a $2 billion, two-year plus incur-
sion in Somalia. See John Balzar, Marines Land for Somalia Pullout, L.A. TiMEs, Feb. 28,
1995, at Al.
166. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
167. In 1991, the world witnessed the dissolution of the former Socialist Republic of
Yugoslavia. Since that time the idea of an expanded Greater Serbia has been the driving
force behind Serb involvement in a war which raged for four years in the Balkans. The
goal of the Serb forces, who occupied 70% of the land in Bosnia-Herzogovina, was to
eventually link Serb lands in Bosnia, a U.N.-recognized state, with Serbia proper. In this
quest to claim land, the Serbs, and likely the Bosnian Muslims as well, engaged in sys-
tematic violations of recognized human rights. The most serious charges asserted by the
Bosnian Muslim government accuse the Serbs of engaging in ethnic cleansing as a
means of nation-building. 1994 was particularly embarrassing for the five nation Con-
tact Group, comprising Britain, France, Germany, the United States, and Russia, which
had been trying, albeit unsuccessfully, to broker a lasting peace agreement. A U.N.
peacekeeping force is stationed on the ground in Bosnia to assure the delivery of human-
itarian aid to civilians. The United States, however, refused to place American ground
troops under U.N. Command. As peacekeepers were harassed, humiliated, and held
hostage, the United States pressed its allies in NATO to carry out air strikes against
Serbian forces that attacked U.N.- designated safe areas. Britain and France, with siza-
ble ground contingents stationed in Bosnia, vetoed any such action; as the world's great
powers looked on helplessly, Bosnia continued to crumble and atrocities continued to
go unpunished. See Tony Barber, Serb Success, NATO's Failure, Bosnia's Misery: 1994:
Moments That Made The Year, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 26, 1994, at 9. See also Bill Schiller,
How the West Didn't Win: It's Nearing Deal With the Serbs That Effectively Endorses Ethnic
Cleansing as a Means of Nation-Building, ToRoNro STAR, Dec. 4, 1994, at DI.
In September of 1995, the Bosnian Serbs faced the first substantial military strikes by
NATO forces in retaliation for their siege of the U.N. safe area in Sarajevo. This bom-
bardment led to an agreement among the warring parties to hold peace talks. As one
commentator writes, "It has taken four years, more than a quarter of a million lives and
countless broken promises from the West to reach this point of faint hope and fragile
diplomatic coherence." Roger Cohen, Finally Torn Apart, The Balkans Can Hope, N.Y.
TnwEs, Sept. 3, 1995, at E6. See Bosnia After the Cease-fire, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1995, at
Al. Throughout November, the Muslims, Croats, and Serbs negotiated a peace settle-
ment in Dayton, Ohio. This accord preserves Bosnia as a single state and requests the
assistance of NATO in maintaining the cease-fire. Address to the Nation on Implementa-
tion of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzogovina, 31 WEaELY COMP. PPES. Doc. 2060.
See Roger Cohen, Balkan Accord: The Outlook, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 15, 1995, at A20. In
early December 1995, NATO began deploying a 60,000-strong force, including 20,000
U.S. soldiers. See Robert Fox, 60,000 NATO Troops to Enforce the Deal, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Nov. 22, 1995, at 14; Timothy Clifford, First U.S. Troops in Sarajevo, DAILY
NEws, Dec. 5, 1995, at 2. However, so much blood has been shed creating ethnically
pure regions that no matter how successful this long-awaited peace agreement is, it will
not be possible to rebuild a completely multiethnic State. Thousands of returnees and
new arrivals will likely experience tense homecomings.
168. The disintegration of Rwanda into chaos and anarchy has evoked much sympa-
thy from the world community, but very little action has been taken to stop or even slow
the carnage. France deployed several hundred troops to Rwanda from late 1990 to late
1993 with the goal of bolstering the Hutu-led government after Tutsi rebels mounted an
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ties and deprivation were equally real.
Of course, the restoration of President Aristide to power in Haiti does
not necessarily guarantee democratic rule and respect for human rights.
16 9
One commentator suggests that the U.S. leadership has made an ideologi-
cal choice to intervene abroad on the side of the hard left.170 He reminds
the reader that the 1991 coup against Aristide was heavily supported by the
middle class who feared the expropriation of their property by the new
government.' 7 1 These contradictions and ulterior motives merely suggest
that international law played a minute, if any, role in the Clinton decision
to invade Haiti, despite lengthy lobbying by the U.S. delegation at the
United Nations.' 7 2 History may judge Resolution 940 to be an unwise
invasion from Uganda. In August 1993, a peace agreement was brokered, and soon
after, a 2500 person U.N. force entered the country. Subsequently, Belgium, the largest
contingent in the U.N. peacekeeping mission, withdrew its forces when 10 Belgians were
killed by the remnant of the Hutu-dominated government. The United States lacks the
political will to send American troops to Rwanda, given the ill-fated 1992-93 deployment
to Somalia and the absence of U.S. geopolitical interests in the area. As a result, the
cease-fire has not been enforced, and the international community has shunned the
opportunity to break the cycle of lawlessness and mass murder in Rwanda. The violence
reached epic proportions following the death of Rwanda's president in a plane crash in
April 1994 as Hutu soldiers and militia slaughtered several hundred thousand people,
most of them Tutsi. Nonetheless, the Clinton Administration remains consistent in pur-
suing its policy of non-intervention despite the mounting death toll and a growing refu-
gee tide. See Elaine Sciolino, For West, Rwanda is Not Worth the Political Candle, N.Y.
TIMES, April 15, 1994, at A3; Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Troop Withdrawal Ends Frustrat-
ing Mission to Save Rwandan Lives, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 3, 1994, at All; Raymond Bonner,
Unsolved Rwanda Mystery: The President's Plane Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1994, at Al.
Approximately one year after the plane crash, Rwanda remained a "scene of carnage
and desolation." Donatella Lorch, As Many as 2,000 Are Reported Dead in Rwanda, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 24, 1995, at Al. In an effort to get members of the Hutu ethnic group to
return to their homes, the Rwandan military, now controlled by the Tutsi, closed down
several refugee camps and directed 50,000 people to a hillside in Kibeho. Armed Hum
militias within this group incited the crowd to run through troop lines. The ensuing
panic resulted in 2000 deaths and more than 600 injuries. Id. This atrocity did not
convince the international community to take a more active role in Rwanda. In fact, the
massacre was followed by a major reduction of the U.N. military presence in Rwanda.
Christopher S. Wren, U.N. to Withdraw Over Half of Military Force in Rwanda, N.Y.
TIME, June 10, 1995, at A5. Over one million Hutu refugees in Zaire were given until the
end of 1995 to return to Rwanda. This time schedule was eventually deemed unwork-
able. Any attempt to force such a large-scale return of Hum refugees is likely to trigger a
reoccurrence of violence in Rwanda. See James C. McKinleyJr., Zaire Steps Up Pressure
on Rwandans to Go Home, N.Y. TmnEs, Feb. 15, 1996, at A3 (discussing how a few recent
arrivals were beaten and tortured by Tutsi solders).
169. On January 6, 1995, the United States began the forced repatriation of almost
4000 Haitian refugees who had been living at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. However,
despite President Aristide's safe return and the presence of over 5000 American troops
in Haiti, a number of refugees assert that paramilitary gunmen and former backers of
the military junta continue to occupy several police posts in the countryside, where they
terrorize supporters of the Aristide Administration. See Larry Rohter, U.S. Starts the
Return of Haitians from Guantdnamo, N.Y. Twms, Jan. 7, 1995, at A3.
170. See Scott McConnell, Welcome to the Clinton Doctrine, N.Y. PosT, Oct. 7, 1994, at
23.
171. Id.
172. Although it is likely that the Clinton Administration did not entirely ignore inter-
national legal norms, a constellation of factors external to decision-makers and to law
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decision. If so, the United Nations will regret the setback which it inflicted
upon its own international reputation as an effective and impartial legal
organization.
2. U.N. Charter Revision: A New Chapter on Human Rights
If the U.N. Security Council is to possess legitimately the power to author-
ize humanitarian intervention, then the Charter must be revised to define
certain human rights violations as a threat to international peace and
security. One possible solution is to amend the U.N. Charter by adding a
new chapter dealing with human rights.173 This would allow outside
forces to "go regularly and determinedly to the source of the problem in the
home country."174 Intervention would still depend upon the interests of
the five permanent members of the Security Council, each of which would
retain its veto power.175 In addition, a greater role for the United Nations
in the military arena might require establishing permanent armed forces
for successful enforcement action. To complement the establishment of a
permanent U.N. military force, the new chapter could include provisions
for an international criminal court responsible for trying crimes against
humanity, not only during wartime but also in cases of civil conflict and
oppressive dictatorships. 17 6
often contribute to a particular foreign policy determination. As Professor Henkin
stated:
[it is never possible to say how much law weighed among the forces that
restrained action. The evidence is usually not available, and, at bottom, conclu-
sive evidence can not exist, for if indeed one had access to all the records, if the
actors told all, one could not be confident that one had reached the springs of
official behaviour.
Louis Henkin, Comment, in THOMAS EHRUcH, CYPRUS 1958-1967, at 129 (1974). The
1991 Gulf War indicated that the international community is more receptive to military
actions sanctioned by the United Nations and involving coalition forces. See infra note
179 and accompanying text. The support for Operation Desert Storm sharply contrasted
with the widespread criticism received by the Reagan and Bush Administrations for their
interventions in Grenada and Panama. See supra part II.A.1.b. In deciding to lobby at
the United Nations, the Clinton Administration may simply have been drawing upon
this history lesson.
173. See Kartashkin, supra note 162, at 209 (proposing revision of the U.N. Charter).
174. Martin, supra note 107, at 479.
175. U.N. CHAlnn art. 27, 3. Because China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States possess permanent status and veto power on the U.N. Security
Council, these states will ultimately determine when to authorize intervention. Support-
ers of a U.N. Charter amendment assume that intervention decisions will turn on the
severity of human rights abuses in a particular country. See Kartashkin, supra note 162,
at 208-09. In reality, alliances and the national interests of the five permanent members
will dictate U.N. intervention policy. Such selective application of the intervention
power would undermine the goal of encouraging all nations to comply with interna-
tional human rights commitments.
176. For a discussion of the potential role of an international criminal court, see
James Crawford, Current Developments: The ILC's Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Tribunal, 88 AM.J. INr'L L. 140 (1994); Michael P. Scharf, Getting Serious About
an International Criminal Court, 6 PACE ILr't L. Ruv. 103 (1994). Jonathan Power, The
Case For a World Criminal Court, ToRomo STAR, Jan. 8, 1995, at D4; Jonathan Power, A
World of Law, Not Men, BALT. Sut, Jan. 6, 1995, at 15A
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These additions to the U.N. Charter would, of course, ignore the cardi-
nal feature of international political and legal systems-sovereignty. A U.N.
Charter amendment would authorize forcible action to protect human
rights in situations which do not present threats to or breaches of the
peace. Although there is a consensus among Member States that acts of
aggression threaten the welfare of the entire international community,1'77
the behavior of a sovereign within its own borders does not necessarily
pose the same danger. For this reason, internal changes have traditionally
resulted from internal forces or peacefully by international agreement. 178
A new approach to intervention could actually undermine the achieve-
ments of the United Nations, epitomized by the successful coalition against
aggression in the 1991 Gulf War.179 The united military effort against Iraq
was a classic defense of the nation-state system, reinforcing the common
value of national sovereignty.' 80 After the Gulf conflict, hope emerged that
the United Nations would finally be able to serve its long-standing purpose
177. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text. One scholar appropriately noted
that the Framers of the U.N. Charter "were agreed that force was not to be used against
another state even to achieve democracy, however defined. Over forty years later states
are still not agreed as to what democracy means, but they are still agreed that it is not to
be achieved by force." Henkin, supra note 134, at 61.
178. "Human rights are indeed violated in every country. In some countries viola-
tions are egregious. But the use of force remains itself a most serious-the most serious-
violation of human rights." Id.
179. On August 2, 1990, an Iraqi force of over 100,000 troops invaded neighboring
Kuwait. After some scattered resistance by the Kuwaitis, the Emir of Kuwait fled to Saudi
Arabia. The U.N. Security Council promptly condemned the invasion, and ordered that
Iraq "withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces." S.C. Res. 660, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc, S/RES/660 (1990). On August 8, Iraq
announced that it was annexing Kuwait and that its decision was irreversible. See
Excerpts from Iraq's Statement on Kuwait, N.Y. Tiams, Aug. 9, 1990, at A18. The ensuing
months resulted in Security Council Resolutions imposing economic sanctions on Iraq
and authorizing the collective use of force to restore the Kuwaiti government. S.C. Res.
661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990) (imposing eco-
nomic sanctions on Iraq); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (1990) (authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to remove Iraqi forces
from Kuwait). OnJanuary 15, 1991, a coalition of allied forces, led by the United States,
commenced offensive combat operations ("Operation Desert Storm") which were sus-
tained for six weeks. Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the
Persian Gulf, 27 WmKLY CoMP. Pmus. Doc. 50 (Jan. 16, 1991). On February 27, 1991,
President George Bush declared "victory for all the coalition partners." Address to the
Nation on the Suspension of Allied Offensive Combat Operations in the Persian Gulf, 27
WEnLY Comp. PPs. Doc. 224 (Feb. 27, 1991). He referred to the formal cease-fire as "a
victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law, and for what is right."
Id.
180. The allied countries "drew a line in the sand," declaring that "the aggression
against Kuwait would not stand." Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military
Action in the Persian Gulf, 27 WEEKLY CoMP. Pm.s. Doc. 224. The key to the coalition's
success was its common purpose and common values. Robin Wright, Gulf Crisis
Rewrites the Policy-Makers' Guidelines, L.A. TimEs, Mar. 4, 1991, at Al, A10. Bruce Hoff-
man, a military analyst at RAND Corp., emphasized that "[t]here was broader and better
integration than ever before because it was so clearly and unambiguously over aggres-
sion." Id. at A10.
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and take global action to fight aggression when necessary.' 81 A human
rights amendment to the Charter would only disrupt the progress of the
organization.
First, the introduction of transboundary force in cases of human rights
violations runs the risk of escalating rather than confining the incidents of
violence, especially when non-military measures such as economic sanc-
tions and scrutiny by international human rights groups offer an effective
alternative. Second, even if collective military action is implemented, inter-
national law faces the danger of being transformed into a system by which
the political objectives of adjacent states and regional powers may be
achieved. Finally, the use of force could be counterproductive by resulting
in an upsurge of support for the reigning regime acting to defend its coun-
try from foreign interference. In essence, any attempt to rework Article
2(4) would strip the international law of the qualities which have made it
so useful in an anarchical world.
B. Eliminating the Mandatory Nature of the Principle of
Nonrefoulement
Another option available to countries confronted with a large influx of asy-
lum seekers is to completely avoid human rights-based scrutiny by circum-
venting the nonrefoulement requirement altogether. This approach would
require taking the Dublin and Schengen agreements to the next logical
step: retaining the right to refuse entry or to expel any applicant without
actually processing the asylum claims. Essentially, the Bush and Clinton
Administrations adopted this approach in their policy of interdiction. By
behaving in an isolationist manner, governments will satisfy their constitu-
ents by preserving the national identity. However, this solution sullies a
Convention which was intended to insure the righteousness and purity of
state parties. As one scholar stated, the Convention "memorializes the
purity of state parties, to ensure that they will escape the taint of any
responsibility so direct and visible as that involved in sending someone
back to the place where he or she is persecuted."' 82
Human rights play a large and visible role in international refugee law.
In fact, the job description of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees explicitly mentions the humanitarian character of the office.' 83 It
thus follows that the Refugee Convention is itself innately humanitarian.
After all, the instrument was initially designed to secure the humanitarian
181. In discussing the significance of the allied campaign, Richard Norton, a fellow at
the International Peace Academy in New York, stated, "The scale of victory is such that
when the Security Council speaks again, its words will have some teeth behind it. In
terms of building a new world order, that's very significant." Wright, supra note 180, at
A10.
182. Martin, supra note 26, at 759.
183. "The work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political charac-
ter;, it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and catego-
ries of refugees." G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/
1775 (1950) (emphasis added).
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objective of relief for the victims of Nazi persecution.' 8 4 Article 33 embod-
ies perhaps the only true right in that Convention. Its efficiency depends
upon the willingness of governments to respond to an essentially humani-
tarian appeal. Any alteration of the right of nonrefoulement would in turn
undermine the rationale of the entire Convention. The ultimate result:
domestic self-interest will always outweigh the human rights of those flee-
ing oppression. In particular, the United States, a nation of immigrants
and refugees, should not resort to a policy so at odds with its values of
democracy, civil rights, and judicial impartiality.
C. Combining Morality & Practicality: A New Type of Regional
Burden-Sharing 185
There is another alternative. Thus far, scholars and leaders have limited
their policy options to polar extremes. As a result, they have locked them-
selves in a no-win situation where refugee law will always conflict with the
principle of national sovereignty. However, one can learn from these good
intentions and incorporate certain aspects of those solutions into a new
legal regime.
1. A New Legal Regime Based Upon International Cooperation
The UNHCR, in its current form, is a well-meaning position plagued with
impotence. Not only is the Commissioner without the power to compel
States to cooperate on refugee problems,186 but the office also lacks suffi-
cient funding to be an effective force of good in a world undergoing enor-
mous social and political change.1 87 As part of an international agency,
the Commissioner must serve as a catalyst for obtaining asylum opportuni-
ties. Thus, this refugee agency must be expanded in order to meet the
demands of the massive flows of migration around the world. Under this
proposal, the Office of the UNHCR would be divided into various commit-
tees, each focusing upon a particular region in the world. The main goal
would be to coordinate efforts within a region when for reasons of war,
famine, impoverishment, or persecution a large number of people are on
the move. By tapping the resources of the developed nations within the
184. Martin, supra note 26, at 755-56.
185. This third solution is proposed by the author.
186. See P.D. Maynard, The Legal Competence of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, 31 IIwr'L & COMP. L.Q. 415, 416 (1982).
187. The projected 1995 budget for the UNCHR is $1.25 billion. Refugee Digest,
supra note 5, at 2. See Edward Epstein, United Nations' Role Coping With Refugee Crisis,
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 6, 1992, at A10 (revealing how a budget cut and a sharp increase in
the number of refugees has led the UNHCR to rely heavily upon assistance from the
states of origin). See also William Duilforce, Refugee Agency in Disarray After Chiefs
Resignation, FiN. Tm s (London), Oct. 30, 1989, at 4 (discussing failure of the UNHCR
to efficiently allocate decision-making power and budget problems resulting from the
elimination of controls on spending); Cindy Shiner, The Superhero of a World at War,
THE GuARDIAN, May 16, 1995, at 10 (indicating that the recent effort to cut costs may
result in untrained and unskilled workers who will undermine the quality of the
agency).
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particular region, the UNHCR would be in a position to spread the respon-
sibilities of asylum through equitable burden-sharing.
In order for this plan to be effective, the developed nations must agree
to submit to the authority of the agency in several ways. First, they would
agree to contribute a certain amount of money annually to a regional
fund. 18 3 The funding, managed by the agency, would finance economic
and social programs which are deficient in other countries within the
region.' 8 9 As a result, the poorer states would still be able to accept an
equitable share of refugees, thereby eliminating a bulk of the burden nor-
mally imposed on the developed nation. Second, all of the nations within a
region would have to abide by a unitary asylum standard. This approach
would abolish the inconsistencies which currently exist while fulfilling the
goal of harmonization set out in both the Dublin and Schengen Conven-
tions. 190 It would also provide a more active role for regional courts of law
which could be responsible for appellate review of the asylum decisions.191
It would be naive to think that this plan will face no obstacles. Indeed,
the mere establishment of a workable legal mechanism for such a program
presents its own challenges. In addition, the proposal is likely to meet ini-
tial opposition from the more developed countries, because of their reluc-
tance to cede sovereign powers relating to border control and judicial
review. 192 However, such barriers are surmountable, especially given the
rapid transformations toward democracy around the globe. The end of the
Cold War has created a new era of cooperation among former enemies,
most clearly evidenced by the Gulf War coalition. This is a new world
order in which the conceptual structure of international law has been sig-
nificantly revised. The new atmosphere lends itself to a discussion of a
wider range of formerly internal matters.
There are two main reasons why this solution has great potential. As
discussed above, the Western world is currently dealing with a surge of
188. The amount of contribution may vary, perhaps based upon a combination of
factors such as gross national product and the indirect costs of immigration to the
national economy. Under the current structure, the top 10 donors to the UNHCR as of
August 3, 1995, are the United States, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, the European
Union, Japan, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, and Switzerland. Refugee Digest,
supra note 5, at 2.
189. Because the United States is the wealthiest nation in its region and the most
frequently sought asylum, the agency structure should, from a practical standpoint, pro-
vide the United States with the opportunity for ample representation and voting power.
Such provisions may be necessary in order to convince the United States to participate
in the international agency, given the recent congressional proposals aimed at limiting
the use of U.S. funds for U.N. peacekeeping activities. See, e.g., S. Res. 420, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995).
190. See supra text accompanying note 79.
191. A more ambitious proposal would include the establishment of a United Nations
Court on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons. This Court would allow
aggrieved refugees to redress violations of international refugee law.
192. Similar concerns have been voiced by the U.S. Justice and Defense Departments
with regard to the establishment of a global criminal court to deal with war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and other international problems such as hijacking and drug
trafficking. See Time for a Global Criminal Court, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 21, 1994, at A14.
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nationalism which has resulted in opposition to liberal asylum policies.193
Under the new international legal regime, wealthy states, such as the
United States, which are surrounded by less developed nations, will gain
additional assistance from these countries without sacrificing their com-
mitment to providing a safe refuge. In addition, this proposal contemplates
a change in current refugee law by stripping the refugee of his choice of
refuge. Although the UNHCR may still consider refugee preferences in
determining the final destination of refugees, the burden-sharing objective
will allow officials to ferret out those asylum seekers who are exclusively
economic migrants.
Second, the new arrangement will maintain the spirit of the original
Refugee Convention. 194 The remodeled refugee agency will continue to
assert the right possessed by victims of human rights abuse to migrate
from the place of persecution. Thus, the humanitarian goals of the signato-
ries to that Convention remain unscathed. In fact, the Declaration on Ter-
ritorial Asylum specifically advocates the achievement of "international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cul-
tural or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights .... .19 5 It declares that "[w]here a State finds difficulty
in granting or continuing to grant asylum, States individually or jointly or
through the United Nations shall consider, in a spirit of international soli-
darity, appropriate measures to lighten the burden on that State." 196
Unfortunately, nations have yet to give serious attention to the concept of
burden-sharing. However, recent events indicate a willingness to move in
this direction. During the early stages of the Haitian boat exodus, Presi-
dent Bush attempted to disperse the refugees throughout Latin America by
soliciting the aid of Honduras and Venezuela.' 97 Similarly, President Clin-
ton requested help from the Caribbean nations of Jamaica, Grenada, Domi-
nica, Antigua, and Panama. 198 Neither effort was very successful because
each lacked adequate coordination and funding.199 This proposal directly
193. See supra text accompanying notes 71, 102.
194. See discussion supra part I.A.
195. This non-binding declaration, which reiterated many of the principles of the
1951 Convention, was unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1967.
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 81, U.N. Doe. A/6716 (1967). Building upon the spirit of the declaration, the United
Nations subsequently convened a conference to draft a Convention on Territorial Asy-
lum which ended in failure. See Frelick, supra note 90, at 677 & n.12 (1977 conference
was "highly politicized, indeed catastrophic").
196. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 195, art. 2(2).
197. See Al Kamen, Bush Defends Policy on Return of Haitians, WASH. PoST, Nov. 21,
1991, at A36.
198. See Panama to Receive 10,000 Haitians, Others Offer Haven, REurEs, July 5, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File; Michael Rezendes, A Policy Lost at Sea,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 1994, at 67.
199. Because of the harsh economic conditions in Honduras and reported abuse of
refugees by military personnel in that country, nearly all of the Haitians who were trans-
ferred there under the Bush Administration voluntarily repatriated. See Haitian Interdic-
tion Crisis Erupts, REFuGEE REP., Nov. 29, 1991, at 1. Similarly, in the Dominican
Republic, reports reveal harsh, abusive, and restrictive treatment of Haitian laborers. See
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addresses those problems. By controlling the flow of refugees, a well-
organized burden-sharing program furthers the human rights principles of
international refugee law while reducing the burden imposed on the receiv-
ing states.
2. Shedding the Moralistic Disguise and Following the National Interest
The burden-sharing approach recognizes that it is immoral to ask a nation
to embark on altruistic policies oblivious of the national interest.200 This
Note illustrates this point by examining the manipulation of refugee admis-
sions for political purposes during the Cold War, and, subsequently, the
protectionist rationale which guided European and American refugee pol-
icy during the early 1990s. 20 1 As early as the sixteenth century, political
philosophers such as Niccol6 Machiavelli explored the idea that morality
has no place in international politics. In The Prince, he argued that a sover-
eign, in order to maintain itself, must be able to "learn to be able not to be
good, and to use this and not use it according to necessity."20 2 Essentially
Machiavelli believed that governments must act out of necessity and not
under the guise of morality. He reasoned that the prince who "makes a
profession of good in all regards" comes to ruin among so many who are
not good.203 The necessities of the State leave little room for moral choice.
Because international relations are not controlled by universal moral prin-
ciples,204 humanitarian intervention, which seeks to project national moral
Frelick, supra note 90, at 684. More recently, Panama reneged on an agreement to pro-
vide haven for up to 10,000 refugees because of its economic inability to absorb such an
influx. See Rezendes, supra note 198, at 67.
200. This approach therefore seeks to separate international refugee law from the
humanitarian issues involved, and instead examines the apparatus for dealing with refu-
gee crises from a realist point of view, i.e., thinking and acting in terms of the national
interest. Humanitarian intervention is essentially a crusade on the part of the interven-
ing nation to impose its moral values upon another sovereign State. It is a foreign policy
driven by moral considerations. On the contrary, a regional burden-sharing program
will focus upon achievement of the national interest, namely halting the influx of refu-
gees, while respecting the territorial sovereignty of the home country. Although this
alternative also fulfills the humanitarian objectives of refugee law, it removes the human
rights rhetoric of refugee protection from center stage in the immigration debate. Con-
sequently, the national interest becomes the ultimate standard used to shape refugee
policy.
201. This protectionist attitude reflects legitimate national economic and social con-
cerns, and should play a dominant role in guiding foreign policy. For examples of how
these concerns have affected refugee law, see discussion supra part I.B. See also supra
notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
202. NiccoLo MAciIAvE.U, THE PRINcE 61 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. trans., 1985).
203. Id. Thus, the sovereign state, in carrying out foreign relations, is not subject to a
rule of ordinary morality. Alexander Hamilton reiterated this concept that the rule of
morality is not the same between nations as between individuals: "Whence it follows
that an individual may, on numerous occasions, meritoriously indulge the emotions of
generosity and benevolence, not only without an eye to, but even at the expense of, his
own interest. But a government can rarely, if at all, be justifiable in pursuing a similar
course. ... " HANs J. MORGENTHAU, IN DaSENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTaRSr 16 (1951)
(quoting Alexander Hamilton's April 1793 "Pacificus" article in the Federalist Papers).
204. For a critique of this view, see Arnold Wolfers, Statesmanship and Moral Choice,
in 1 WoRmD PoLmcs 175 (1949) (arguing that there is a realm for moral judgment in
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standards onto the international scene, 205 can never succeed as a legiti-
mate means for offsetting mass refugee movements. Proponents of inter-
vention are deceived by an illusion that nations can escape into a realm
where action is guided solely by moral principles when, in fact, the appeal
to moral principles in the international sphere has no concrete universal
meaning. It is the individual State which creates morality as well as law.
For this reason, in the United States, one is able to ascertain objectively the
meaning of moral principles such as justice and equality. There is no such
consensus in the relations between nations.20 6 Rather, it is a political
necessity for the individual members of international society to take care of
their own national interests.
Does this mean that international law itself is a farce? One can take
this reasoning to an extreme and reach such a conclusion. However, the
burden-sharing proposal set forth in this Note reveals how international
law can succeed when it is in the best interest of all nations. The socioeco-
nomic and political impacts of refugee flows are incompatible with the
national interests of states. Because refugee movements directly or indi-
rectly affect every nation, it is logical to think that a universal problem
requires a universal solution. By agreeing to interstate legal obligations,
each nation acts in its own best interest while avoiding the moral judg-
ments of humanitarianism. 20 7
Conclusion
Refugee law owes its current structure to an earlier time when the major
concern of the international community was establishing an institutional
framework which would partly atone for the pre-War callousness of receiv-
ing nations. The Cold War brought a semblance of stability to world geog-
raphy, and home exit controls in communist countries spared the Western
nations any major influx of refugees. However, the West was unprepared
for the collapse of the Soviet empire. Faced with resurgent nationalism at
foreign policy, although it involves a different set of normative standards than prevails in
domestic affairs).
205. In his televised speech to the American public regarding the impending invasion
of Haiti, President Clinton cited the need to "stop the brutal atrocities that threatens
thousands of Haitians," and the U.S. responsibility to "promote democracy" in Haiti.
President Clinton also referred to the responsibility of the United States "to respond
when inhumanity offends our values." 30 WEEKLY Comp. PRES. DoC. 1779.
206. See MoRGENTHAu, supra note 203, at 34 ("Universal moral principles, such as
justice or equality, are capable of guiding political action only to the extent that they
have been given concrete content and have been related to political situations by
society.").
207. The contributions of each nation to the refugee agency should not be thought of
as a question of moral principle or selfless generosity. Thinking in "moral" terms does
not produce an adequate standard for determining the amount of assistance to be given,
and is likely to err on the side of too excessive a contribution. Rather, membership in
the international organization should be viewed as a means to an end, an instrument
which can be used for the pursuit of the national interest. In this way, the organization
becomes a type of alliance, with each developed nation sharing a common goal. The
amount of aid to be given by a nation should be determined solely in view of the contri-
bution it is likely to make to reaching that country's ideal level of immigration.
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home and instability in Eastern Europe, Western leaders were forced to
reevaluate aging refugee policies. Initially, the impulse was to implement
laws which prevented asylum seekers from entering the receiving state in
the first place. If interdiction was coarse and immoral, the alternative of
intervention reflected a foreign policy guided by moral abstractions.
This Note suggests that the issue of political asylum cannot be mas-
tered by intervening at the source of the problem in the home country
because such interference collides with the principle of national sover-
eignty. A more practical solution changes the underpinnings of interna-
tional refugee law from a question of moral condemnation to a matter of
common national interest. Each developed nation benefits from burden-
sharing in a contemporary world where mass exodus has become an unfor-
tunate reality. The success of a new international foundation to help con-
trol the flow of refugees will depend upon the quantity of financial and
human resources that the developed nations are willing to invest in order
to limit the flow of refugees to their shores. Eventually, each country will
have to weigh the potential societal contributions of asylum seekers against
the costs which these new arrivals impose on citizens already present and
working within national borders.
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